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Abstract 
Information security is a crucial concern of modern communication. With the 
help of cryptography, information can be concealed from undesired people. 
However, conventional cryptography only provides conditional security, which 
tends to be broken by the increasing computational power people can get 
nowadays.  
Quantum key distribution was invented in response to the need of 
unconditional security. It is based on the unbreakable laws of quantum 
mechanics, which offers the ability to detect the eavesdropper (Ev) during the 
key distribution process, thus it provides unconditional security.  
As the most important quantum key distribution protocol, the BB84 protocol 
suggested an effective way to establish a secret key between two communicating 
entities (Alice and Bob); however, it experiences some inherent waknesses. It 
has a very low efficiency in getting a raw key and a final key; it takes a long 
time and much communication and computation overheads to get a short final 
key; it does not have effective defense mechanisms to defend against Eve; and 
the conventional channel in the structure indicates a high communicatio  
overhead as well as security vulnerabilities.  
Aiming at the weaknesses of the BB84 protocol, this dissertation prposes 
three novel quantum key distribution protocols to improve the efficiency of the 
key distribution process. By making use of a dual-quantum channel and a novel 
xv 
basis selection rule, the raw key efficiency is improved from 50% to 100%, 
which means all the random bits generated by Alice are included into the raw 
key. The proposed protocols take advantage of the channel diversity brought by 
the dual-quantum channel to get the final key much faster from the quantum 
channel with a significantly lower raw key error rate or the eavesdropping-free 
quantum channel. Eve’s attack can be effectively frustrated by sending decoy 
information on the quantum channel on which Eve is actively eavesdropping. By 
XORing the sifted key with the initialization vector shared betwe n Alice and 
Bob, the proposed protocols obtain the final key in a much faster and securer 
way, and the length of the final key is kept longest possible. This dissertation 
also presents three real-time detection mechanisms of Eve’s presence, which 
greatly help Alice and Bob defend against Eve’s attack. A protocol proposed in 
this dissertation removes the basis information exchange between Alic  and Bob, 
and further eliminates the necessity of the conventional channel in the structure, 
which not only reduces the communication overhead and cost dramatically, but 
also makes the structure all-quantum, presenting less vulnerability to the 
eavesdropping attack. In addition, the integrated defense mechanism pre ented 
in this dissertation provides an effective countermeasure to frustrate Eve’s attack.   
 
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Ever since the time that people started keeping their own secret from being 
public, there had been security concerns. At that time, the secrets were saved in 
one’s brain or written on a material, such as a piece of paper, and the  hidden in 
a secret place. When computers were invented, and especially after the Internet 
started prevailing in the 1990’s, the way people kept their secrets was changed 
dramatically. Nowadays, secrets are everywhere, flowing on the Internet, 
through computers, cell phones, telephones, and so on, and literally people are 
surrounded by secrets all day long. However, most of the secrets do not exist in 
the form of characters on a piece of paper any more, in which case as long as the 
physical security of that piece of paper can be guaranteed, th  information 
carried by that piece of paper is secure; instead, the secrt  are represented by 
0’s and 1’s, in a digital form, which are later transmitted from place to place. 
Since the secrets are represented digitally and transmitted between digital 
devices, how to keep them safe and prevent them from being revealed becomes 
a big concern, which is the security concern. In the digital age we are living 
right now, people managed to create many effective security mechanisms to 
keep secrets secure, and for a period of time those mechanisms worked very 
well. However, nobody wins all the time in the war of keeping secrets. With 
currently available and yet developing technologies, those people who are 
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interested in revealing secrets have gradually gained the ability to achieve their 
goals. Those security mechanisms that used to be effective at a time are loosing 
their confidence in protecting secrets. However, on the other hand, those people 
who want to keep the secrecy of the secrets are also working hard to realize their 
goals. Many researchers have contributed tremendously in every aspect of the 
field of information security, and many advanced security mechanisms have 
been proposed and applied. For the past several decades, researchers have been 
proposing security mechanisms that provide adequate but conditional security 
suited for the current technologies and people’s current needs, while at the same 
time searching for security mechanisms that can provide unconditional security. 
In this dissertation, the author is dedicated to providing unconditional 
communication security and presents the latest research results that will help 
build unconditional security mechanisms for the future.     
 
1.1 A Brief History of Cryptography  
Information security has always been a concern. About 1500 BC ago, the 
Mesopotamian people wrote a secret recipe in non-standard characters on a clay 
tablet and enclosed it in a clay envelope [1], Figure 1.1 [2]. If the recipient 
noticed that the clay envelope was broken when he got it, he knew that 
somebody had read the clay tablet. However since the information on that clay 
3 
tablet was written in some rare, unusual characters, the person who intercepted 




Figure 1.1 The Mesopotamian clay tablet and envelope 
 
The ancient Greeks, and the Spartans in particular, are said to have used the 
“scytale” to communicate during campaigns [3]. A scytale is a tool used to 
transpose the letters in a message so that people who intercept it can not read it. 
It consists of a cylinder with a strip of leather wound around it and the message 
is written on the strip of leather, Figure 1.2 [3]. When people want to deliver a 
message, they deliver the strip of leather. Because the letters in the message are 
transposed, it is not intelligible to the enemies. Only the person who has the 
4 
cylinder with the same radius can read the message, when he winds the strip of 
leather around his cylinder.      
 
 
Figure 1.2 A scytale 
. 
Different from the scytale transposition cipher used by the Greeks, which 
used one of the two core techniques of modern symmetric cryptography, i.e., 
permutation, Julius Caesar used the other technique, namely, substantiation, to 
encrypt a message. He used the letter that is three positions dow  in the alphabet 
to replace a letter in the message, so that the message after encryption is 
unintelligible to others [4].  
    During the development of the cryptography, many cryptographic algorithms 
making use of permutation, substitution, and a single key for encryption have 
been proposed, such as Monoalphabetic Cipher, Playfair Cipher, Hill Cipher, 
Polyalphabetic Cipher, One-Time Pad, Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple 
5 
Data Encryption Standard (3DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), RC4, 
and so on [5]. All these cryptographic algorithms are referred to as the 
symmetric cryptography, since only one key is used for both encryption and 
decryption. 
Permutation and substitution remained as the core techniques for the 
symmetric cryptography until the invention of the asymmetric cryptography in 
1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman [5], whose algorithm was 
named RSA [6]. The RSA algorithm was the result of responding to the 
challenge proposed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman to invent public-key 
systems [7]. As an asymmetric cryptography, the RSA algorithm makes use of 
two keys, one public key and one private key, to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
The security offered by asymmetric cryptography relies on the infeasibility of 
currently available computers solving a very difficult mathematical problem 
within polynomial time, which actually only provides conditional security. With 
the increasing computational power people can get nowadays, the asymmetric 
cryptography tends to be broken more easily than before.  
The symmetric and asymmetric cryptography are referred to as the 
conventional cryptography, whose security is computational-difficulty-based. 
Due to the increasing security breaches, there is an urgent need for a
cryptography that can provide unconditional security. In 1984, Charles Bennett 
and Gilles Brassard invented the first quantum key distribution protocol, the 
6 
BB84 protocol [8], which opened the door for the research of quantum 
cryptography and quantum key distribution. Since then, many researchers hav  
contributed tremendously in this field, and the research of quantum 
cryptography and quantum key distribution has become a hot topic.  
 
1.2 Information Security Becomes a Crucial Concern 
With the popularity of the Internet and the extensive usage of computers for 
business and personal purposes, a great deal of sensitive information is flowing 
over the Internet every second. That sensitive information may include business 
information, trade secrets, social security numbers, credit card numbers, bank 
accounts, and so on, and the loss of any of which to others would bring very 
serious aftermaths. Businesses with stolen information may bear extremely 
expensive losses, which can cause great reductions of revenue, losing 
competitions to the rivals, and even bankruptcies. The stolen personal 
information can be used to fake IDs, steal money, commit crimes, and so forth. 
So it is a very important issue to protect information security.  
During the past years, security incidents and breaches have increased 
dramatically, and more and more people are affected. According to the data 
recorded by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the reported 
7 
security incidents increased from only 6 times in 1988 to 138 thousand times in 
2003, Table 1.1 [9]. 
 
Table 1.1 Security incident reports received by CERT 
 
 
According to the reports by the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC), in 
2005, there were 158 incidents, affecting more than 64.8 million people [10]. In 
2006, the number of security breaches increased to 312, affecting nearly 20 
million individuals. About 29% of the security breaches were reported by 
government/military agencies, 28% by educational institutions, 22% by general 
businesses, 13% by health care facilities/companies, and 8% by banking/credit/ 
financial services entities [11]. In 2007, 446 security breaches were reported, 
which exposed almost 128 million pieces of records [12].  
Information security is becoming a crucial concern, due to the increasing 
number and severity of the security breaches. People are trying o cope with the 
security breaches, and are actively seeking effective security mechanisms to 
8 
provide better information security. Although many achievements have been 
accomplished, there is still a long way to dealing with all kinds of security 
breaches in which more sophisticated attacking techniques are being used. 
  
1.3 Quantum Computers and Quantum Algorithms 
People are looking for better security mechanisms; however, at the sam  time 
people are searching for more powerful computational machines. A quantum 
computer [13, 14] is a powerful computational machine to which people have 
been dedicated for a while. A quantum computer has extremely powerful 
parallel computational capabilities, and it is considered to be able to break all the 
computational-difficulty-based conventional cryptographic algorithms. For 
example, it takes the classical computer )(NO time to solve the unsorted 
database search problem, however, with Grover’s quantum database search
algorithm [15], it only takes )( NO time, whereN is the number of the entries in 
the unsorted database. The factorization problem of a very large composite 
number is extremely difficult to solve using a classical computer. The best 
known classical algorithm, the General Number Field Sieve Algorithm [16], 
works in exponential time )2( )(log
3
1
NO , whereN is the composite number. In 
1994, Peter Shor from AT&T discovered a quantum algorithm that could 
9 
factorize a very large composite numberN in polynomial time ))((log 3NO [17], 
which is exponentially faster than the best known classical algorithm.  
    The development of quantum computers and quantum algorithms indicates 
that when people can build quantum computers and have quantum algorithms 
running on them, breaking the conventional cryptography would be very easy. 
In this situation, in order to keep information secure, we really need an advanced 
cryptography, which is not based on computational difficulty, but is based on a 
totally different idea, which provides unconditional security, and about which 
even a quantum computer can do nothing. That advanced cryptography is 
quantum cryptography.  
 
1.4 Contributions of this Dissertation 
In this dissertation, the author is dedicated to the research of quantum key 
distribution. Aiming at the low-efficiency problem of currently available 
quantum key distribution protocols, the author conducted a lot of research and 
achieved significant results. The contributions of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. The author proposed a dual-quantum channel structure for the quantum 
key distribution process, which improved the efficiency of sharing the 
raw key. And due to the channel diversity brought by the dual-quantum 
10 
channel structure, the final key was established in a faster way, and the 
eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) attack was effectively thwarted.  
2. The author presented a novel basis selection rule to improve the raw key 
efficiency and deter the eavesdropper. When combined with the dual-
quantum channel, the raw key efficiency was greatly improved, and 
subsequently the convergence speed of the final key was much faster.   
3. With the aid of an initialization vector shared betw en the two 
communicating entities (Alice and Bob) and known to only themselves, 
the eavesdropper’s attack was effectively frustrated, and the final key 
was obtained in a much faster and efficient way.  
4. The author proposed three real-time detection mechanisms of Eve’s 
presence during the key distribution process. The proposed mechanisms 
enabled the Alice and Bob to detect whether Eve was eavesdropping or 
not in real time, which provided an effective method to avoid and 
counter Eve’s attack.  
5. This dissertation presented a quantum key distribution protocol that 
removed the basis information exchange on the conventional channel, 
and further eliminated the necessity of the conventional channel in the 
structure, which greatly reduced the communication overhead and cost. 
In addition, the elimination of the conventional channel made the 
structure of the proposed protocol all-quantum. This all-quantum 
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structure presented less vulnerability than the hybrid structure with 
classical elements (for example, a conventional channel) in it.  
6. In order to better frustrate Eve’s attack, this dissertation incorporated 
several effective defense mechanisms making use of the idea of 
introducing more randomnesses and unpredictabilities nto the structure. 
The integration of those countermeasures made Eve unable to launch 
successful attacks to the key distribution process.      
 
1.5 Organization of this Dissertation 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows:  
Chapter 1 is an instruction, which includes a brief h story of cryptography, the 
increasing security breaches, and the development of quantum computers and 
quantum algorithms. It also summaries the contributions and organization of this 
dissertation;    
Chapter 2 introduces the conventional cryptography, including the symmetric 
cryptography, asymmetric cryptography, and several popular cryptographic 
algorithms. It points out the ineffectiveness of the conventional cryptography to 
defend against future security attacks, due to the fact that the conventional 
cryptography is only able to provide conditional security;    
12 
In Chapter 3, we introduce the theoretical basis of quantum cryptography, 
several major quantum key distribution protocols, and the applications of 
quantum key distribution in practices. We also discus  the unconditional 
security offered by quantum key distribution, as well as the weaknesses of the 
BB84 protocol;  
In Chapter 4, we present a quantum key distribution protocol making use of a 
dual-quantum channel structure and complementary measuring bases on the two 
quantum channels; we analyze the raw key efficiency and raw key error rate in 
different scenarios; and we propose several methods t  speed up the 
convergence speed of the final key while at the same ti e effectively frustrate 
Eve’s attack. We compare the proposed protocol withthe BB84 protocol, and 
show the superiority of the proposed protocol;   
In Chapter 5, we propose a novel basis selection rule with the aid of an 
initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob. Together with the dual-
quantum channel, the proposed protocol improves the efficiency of obtaining the 
raw key and the convergence speed of the final key, and meanwhile offers much 
better performance in frustrating Eve’s attack than that of the BB84 protocol;  
In Chapter 6, we analyze how to reduce the communication overhead on the 
conventional channel by deploying the dual-quantum channel structure, the basis 
selection rule on the two quantum channels, and the initialization vector shared 
between Alice and Bob. Our proposed protocol eliminates the basis information 
13 
exchange between the two communicating entities, and further eliminates the 
necessity of the conventional channel in the structure. We also present three 
real-time detection mechanisms of Eve’s presence during the key distribution 
process, which help Alice and Bob to detect, avoid, and frustrate Eve’s attack. It 
is proved that the proposed protocol presents many advantages in reducing the 
communication overhead, the cost, and defending against Eve’s attack; 
In Chapter 7, several defense mechanisms that can confuse, fool and counter 
Eve’s attack are addressed. The basic idea behind tese defense mechanisms is 
to import more randomnesses and unpredictabilities nto the key distribution 
process. The integration of these techniques increases the difficulty of Eve to 
launch a successful eavesdropping attack, and as a result, Eve’s attack is 
effectively frustrated; and  
Chapter 8 concludes the entire dissertation and points out some future 







Chapter 2 Conventional Cryptography 
Cryptography is an art of concealing information. It converts intelligible 
information into unintelligible or meaningless information, which nobody can 
read without properly decrypting. This is how the secret information can be kept 
secret. The secret information that people want to hide and transmit is called 
plaintext, while the unintelligible message after encryption is called ciphertext. 
The process of converting plaintext into ciphertext is called encryption, and the 
reverse process, which is restoring plaintext from ciphertext is called decryption. 
In order to be able to encrypt and decrypt messages, th  two communicating 
entities, Alice and Bob, need to share some kind of initial secret between them 
ahead of time, which is later used in the encryption and decryption processes. 
That initial secret is called an encryption/decryption key. According to whether 
the keys used for encryption and decryption are the same, conventional 
cryptography is categorized into two classes: symmetric cryptography and 
asymmetric cryptography. In symmetric cryptography, the encryption and 
decryption processes make use of the same key, while in asymmetric 
cryptography, encryption and decryption use two different keys. The general 




Figure 2.1 The structure of conventional cryptosystems 
 
2.1 Symmetric Cryptography 
In symmetric cryptography, Alice and Bob use the same key for both encryption 
and decryption. That key is referred to as a secret key and thus symmetric 
cryptography is also called secret key cryptography, or single-key encryption [5]. 
The core techniques of symmetric cryptography are pe mutation and substitution, 
and the security of the symmetric cryptography relies on the secrecy of the 
secret key. Permutation is the process of transposing the bits in a message, and 
substitution is the process of replacing a bit in a message by another bit. In the 
following sections, we will give a brief introduction to some of the most popular 




2.1.1 Data Encryption Standard  
Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is the most widely used encryption 
scheme adopted in 1977 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) as the Federal Information Processing Standard 46 (FIPS PUB 46) [5]. 
FIPS PUB 46-3 is the latest version of the standard [18]. The DES is a 
symmetric cryptographic algorithm making use of a 56-bit secret key to encrypt 
a message that is divided into a sequence of 64-bit blocks. It deploys a structure 
called the Feistel structure [19], which has the following features:  
1. It has a certain number of rounds of processing, and all the rounds of 
processing are identical;  
2. In each round, the message is divided into two halves, a substitution is 
performed on one half of the message, followed by apermutation of the 
two halves; and  
3. Each round of processing uses different keys that are derived from the 
original secret key.  
The DES algorithm consists of 16 rounds of processing. The invention of the 
DES was mainly contributed by the researchers at IBM in 1970’s, with the help 
of some people outside IBM. The DES had been the most popular cryptographic 
algorithm until the end of last century. In 1999 NIST suggested that DES should 
only be used for legacy systems and triple DES (3DES) should be used as a 
substitute [18]. The DES algorithm is pretty strong against a variety of attacks; 
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however, due to the small size of the encryption key (56 bits) and the increasing 
computational power people can get, it is easy to be broken nowadays. For 
example, the DES algorithm was broken in 22 hours and 15 minutes by the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s “Deep Crack” in a combined effort with 
“distributed.net” in 1999 [20]. Triple DES uses two or three different keys to 
encrypt a message, whose total key size reaches 112 bits or 168 bits, providing 
much stronger security compared to the DES.   
 
2.1.2 Advanced Encryption Standard 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is aiming at replacing DES and 3DES in 
the long run. In 1997, NIST called for a new cryptographic algorithm to replace 
the DES algorithm. In 2001, an algorithm named Rijindael, whose inventers are 
Dr. Joan Daemen and Dr. Vincent Rijimen [5], was select d as the AES 
algorithm and published in FIPS PUB 197 [21]. The AES algorithm does not 
adopt the Feistel structure as the DES; it uses a 128-bit message block and a key 
size of 128, 192, or 256 bits; and the AES deploys 10 rounds of processing, 9 
out of 10 are identical, consisting of four procedures, Substitute Bytes, Shift 
Rows, Mix Columns, and Add Round Key, and the last round contains only 
three procedures, Substitute Bytes, Shift Rows, and Add Round Key. Due to the 
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bigger key size, the AES provides much stronger security than the DES. So far 
there is still no affordable ways to break the AES.   
 
2.1.3 RC4 Algorithm 
The two cryptographic algorithms we just introduced above are both block 
ciphers, since the message is divided into fix-size blocks (64 or 128 bits) and 
each block is treated as a single element when being ncrypted. The RC4 
algorithm is a stream cipher designed by Ron River for RSA Security in 1987 
[5]. In a stream cipher, the message is encrypted ei her byte by byte or bit by bit 
instead of block by block in a block cipher. The RC4 algorithm uses a variable 
key size, such as 128 bits, 192 bits, or even longer. The key is used as the input 
of a pseudorandom number generator, which produces ps udorandom numbers. 
The pseudorandom numbers is then XORed with the messag  to be encrypted 
byte by byte, and the results of the XOR operation form the ciphertext. The 
security of the RC4 algorithm is very strong, and there is no practical attack 
against the algorithm with a reasonably long key size. The primary advantage of 
the RC4 algorithm is that it has a very fast encryption speed so that it runs very 
quickly in software. The RC4 is widely used between web browsers and web 
servers, and in wireless communications as well. The SSL/TLS (Secure Sockets 
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Layer/Transport Layer Security) and WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) 
algorithms also make use of the RC4 algorithm as the encryption mechanism.  
 
2.1.4 One-Time Pad 
None of the abovementioned cryptographic algorithms is able to provide 
unconditional security. In conventional cryptography, the only cryptographic 
algorithm that can provide theatrically unbreakable security is the one-time pad. 
The one-time pad was proposed by a U.S. Army Signal Corps officer, Joseph 
Mauborgne, as an improvement to the Verman cipher invented by an AT&T 
engineer named Gibert Vernam [5]. In the one-time pad algorithm, Mauborgne 
proposed that a message should be encrypted by a ke that has the same length 
as the message and at the same time is a random number. The key is only used 
once, and then it is discarded. For the next messag,  new key of the same 
length as the message is used. Theoretically, one-time pad is unbreakable; 
however, in practice, it is impossible to produce truly random numbers without 
any repetition in the long run. Thus the one-time pad is difficult to be deployed 
in practical situations.    
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2.2 Asymmetric Cryptography 
Different from the symmetric cryptography, where thre is only one key that is 
used for both encryption and decryption of a message, in the asymmetric 
cryptography, the encryption and decryption processes make use of two 
different keys. The two different keys are referred to as a public key and a 
private key, respectively. The asymmetric cryptography is also called the public 
key cryptography, since one of the two keys can be public. In the asymmetric 
cryptography, both of the public key and the private key can be used for 
encryption and decryption. For example, if the public key is used for encryption, 
then the private key is used for decryption, or if the private key is used for 
encryption, then the public key is used for decryption. The asymmetric 
cryptography can provide confidentiality, authentication, and non-repudiation 
features at the same time. The confidentiality feature is realized by encrypting 
the message with the other person’s public key. Since only the other person has 
his private key, he is the only one who can decrypt the message and read it. This 
way the confidentiality is achieved. The authentication and non-repudiation 
features are realized by encrypting the message with your own private key. 
Since you are the only one who has your own private key, the encrypted 
message must have come from you, and you can not deny that you have 
encrypted the message, which provides the authentication and non-repudiation 
features at the same time. The symmetric cryptography can provide 
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confidentiality and authentication between the two communicating entities, but 
it does not offer the non-repudiation feature, since both of the two 
communicating entities share the same key and they can both claim that a 
message is from the other person. We will briefly introduce several major 
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms that are widely being used.  
  
2.2.1 RSA Algorithm 
The RSA algorithm [6] is the most widely used asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithm invented by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman in 1977. It is a 
block cipher, whose block size is a number between 1 a d typically 1024 bits (or 
309 decimal digits). Its security relies on the fact that it is infeasible to factorize 
a huge composite number (309 decimal digits) in a pr ctical time at an 
acceptable cost with currently available technologies. The algorithm is briefly 
shown as follows:  
1. Select two secret large prime numbersp andq , qp ≠ ; 
2. Calculate qpn ×= and releasen to the public, wheren is a number of 
1024 bits;  
3. Calculate )1()1()( −×−= qpnφ , where )(nφ is called Euler’s Totient 
Function, and )(nφ is kept secret; 
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4. Select an integere, which is relatively prime to )(nφ , )(1 ne φ<< , and 
then release; 
5. Calculate ))((mod1 ned φ−≡ , and keep d secret; 
Till now, we have produced the public key },{ nePU = and the private 
key },{ ndPR= . 
6. Calculate the ciphertext nMC e mod= , whereM is the plaintext, 
and nM < ; and 
7. The plaintext can be restored by nCM d mod= . 
The RSA algorithm is very strong against a variety of security attacks, such as 
the brute force attack, mathematical attack, timing attack, chosen ciphertext 
attack, and so on. According to the report by the RSA Laboratories, it will take 
about 55 years on a single 2.2 GHz Opteron CPU to solve the factorization 
problem of a 663-bit composite number, but it will only take about 3 months on 
a cluster of 80 2.2 GHz Opteron CPUs [22] to finish the factorization. However, 
the effort of factorizing a 1024-bit number would be millions of times harder 
than that of the 663-bit number, which makes it infeasible for currently available 
classical computers to solve the problem.  
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2.2.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Although the RSA algorithm is still the most popular asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithm being used so far, the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) starts to 
challenge it. The RSA algorithm requires a lot of cmputational effort, thus it 
has a slow processing speed, which is one of the RSA algorithm’s drawbacks. 
For example, in order to provide confidentiality and authentication at the same 
time, a message needs to be encrypted by the sender’s private key and then 
encrypted again by the receiver’s public key, which requires the sender to run 
the RSA algorithm twice. When decrypting the encrypted message, first the 
receiver’s private key is used, and then the sender’s public key is needed. Since 
for each message to be transmitted, the RSA algorithm needs to run four times, 
the entire process becomes very sluggish and effort-consuming. Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography, on the other hand, is considered to be able to provide the same 
level of security using a considerable smaller key size, and hence requiring 
much less computational efforts than the RSA algorithm.   
   Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a public key cryptography based on the usage 
of elliptic curves over finite fields. The use of elliptic curves in cryptography 
was suggested by Neal Koblitz [23] and Victor S. Miller [24] independently in 
1985. Just like the RSA algorithm, it also has a very difficult mathematical 
problem serving as the bastion of its security, which is referred to as the elliptic 
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curve logarithm problem. The mathematics involved in the algorithm is very 
complicated, and we simple omit it in the dissertation.  
 
2.2.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm was the first public key algorithm 
that was proposed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 [7]. In that 
seminal paper, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman defined the public key 
cryptography, and proposed a way to establish a secret key between the two 
communicating entities using their public and private keys. The security of this 
key exchange algorithm is based on the ineffectiveness of solving the so-called 
discrete logarithm problem. In the following, we will briefly introduce the steps 
of exchanging a secret key between the two communicati g entities, Alice and 
Bob:  
1. Alice and Bob select a prime numberqand a primitive root ofq , which 
is q<αα , ; 
2. Alice selects a private key qPRA < , calculates her public 
key qPU APRA modα= , and transmits APU to Bob; 
3. Bob selects a private key qPRB < , calculates his public 
key qPU BPRB modα= , and transmits BPU to Alice; and 
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4. Alice calculates the secret key by qPUK APRB mod= , and Bob calculates 
the secret key by qPUK BPRA mod= . 
Since qPUqPU BA PRA
PR
B modmod = , Alice and Bob share the same secret 
keyK . The discrete logarithm problem is to get )(log , AqA PUdPR α= , which is 
considered infeasible by using currently available computers. However the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm is subject to the Man-in-the-Middle 
attack, where an attacker Eve communicates to Alice as if she was Bob, and then 
communicates to Bob as if she was Alice, to share a s cret key with Alice and 
another secret key with Bob respectively without Alice’s and Bob’s notices. 
Alice and Bob still think that they are communicating to each other; however, 
they are actually communicating to Eve, instead.   
 
2.3 Conditional Security of Conventional Cryptography  
The conventional cryptography, including the symmetric cryptography and 
asymmetric cryptography, is only conditionally secure, which means that they 
can only provide conditional security to the encrypted message. The 
conventional cryptography is vulnerable to many types of attacks. Despite of the 
many subtle attacks, the brute force attack has always been a serious one to the 
conventional cryptography. The idea of the brute force attack is to try to exhaust 
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all the possible decryption keys to search for a match between the ciphertext and 
the plaintext. The DES algorithm has been broken in 22 hours by the brute force 
attack using the technologies available in 1999. Even the widely used RSA 
algorithm, which is considered very secure, is being challenged due to the 
increasing computational power people can get. In fact, the security of the 
conventional cryptography is based on the hope that the attacker either cannot 
break the ciphertext within the message’s validation me, or the effort needed to 
break the ciphertext is more expensive than the value of the message itself, so 
that the attacker would not bother to attack. This does not necessarily mean that 
the attacker cannot break the ciphertext, it only means that the attacker is not 
willing to do that due to lack of motivations.  
    With the fast development of the computer technologies, people are getting 
more computational power at a much faster pace. Each year people are closer to 
breaking the conventional cryptography. In addition, people can work in a 
cooperative way to break the conventional cryptography by using distributed 
computing techniques. As we mentioned earlier, it will take about 55 years for a 
single 2.2 GHz Opteron CPU to solve the factorization problem of a 663-bit 
number; however, it will only take about 3 months to solve the same problem if 
80 2.2 GHz Opteron CPUs are used at the same time [22].  
Quantum computer is a fast emerging research area. It uses a totally different 
idea to compute, and it provides extremely powerful parallel computing 
27 
capabilities. The realization of quantum computers will exponentially speed up 
the solving of the factorization problem, which will make not only the RSA 
algorithm, but also all the other computational-difficulty-based conventional 
cryptographic algorithms not secure at all.  
 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we talked about the conventional cryptography, including the 
symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography. In the symmetric 
cryptography, we briefly introduced two block ciphers, the DES and AES 
algorithms, and two stream ciphers, the RC4 and one-time pad algorithms. In the 
asymmetric cryptography, we introduced the widely used RSA algorithm, and 
the emerging ECC algorithm, as well as the first public key distribution protocol, 
namely, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. We also discussed the 
conditional security provided by the conventional cryptography, the challenge it 
is facing to the exponentially increasing computational power people can get 
with the fast development of the computer technologies. The discussion showed 





Chapter 3 Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Key 
Distribution 
3.1 Introduction 
Compared to the conventional cryptography introduce in Chapter 2, quantum 
cryptography is a very different cryptography that is based on a totally different 
idea. Quantum cryptography is based on the laws of quantum mechanics, which 
enable the detection of an eavesdropper’s eavesdropping activity during the key 
distribution process, and thus provide unconditional security. The terms 
Quantum Cryptography (QC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) are usually 
exchangeable. Although quantum cryptography may be understood as a method 
of encryption, it is actually a technique to distribute a secret key between two 
communicating entities, so it is better described as quantum key distribution.  
The idea of using quantum mechanics for cryptography was implicitly 
proposed as early as 1969 by Stefan Wiesner in his manuscript; however, the 
manuscript was not published until 1983 [25]. The first quantum key distribution 
protocol was proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Bra sard in their seminal 
paper [8] in 1984, which is referred to as the BB84 protocol. The BB84 protocol 
opened the door of the quantum key distribution research. Since then many 
quantum key distribution protocols have been proposed [26-60], and some of 
them have been implemented in experiments and practices [61-74]. Despite of 
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the numerous quantum key protocols proposed with many variations and 
enhanced features, most of them are based on several major quantum key 
distribution protocols [8, 26-30]. References [75-80] give a more complete 
introduction to quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution. 
 
3.1.1 Polarization of Light 
Although all the particles that manifest quantum mechanics properties can be 
used for quantum key distribution, for example, photons, electrons, ions, and so 
on, photons are the most popular carrier of quantum key distribution. Most of 
the quantum key distribution protocols available so far make the most use of the 
polarization states of photons to realize the key distribution. Now we will briefly 
introduce the concept of polarization of light.  
Light is an electromagnetic wave that is composed of ph tons. It is described 
by the electric field and magnetic field that are perpendicular and proportional to 
each other. When considering the polarization state of light, we only need to 
consider either the electric field or the magnetic field, since the two fields are 
correlated and knowing one equals to knowing the other. Usually the electric 
field is chosen when talking about the polarization state of light.  
Light can be polarized or not polarized at all. According to the projection of 
the electric field vector on the plane perpendicular to the travel direction of the 
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light, polarized light can be linearly polarized, circularly polarized, or 
elliptically polarized, Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Polarization of light 
 
In quantum key distribution protocols, the linear polarization state is mostly 
used. Within the linear polarization state, there afour special polarization 
states that are of particular interest: vertical (90º) polarization, horizontal (0º) 





Figure 3.2 Four polarization states of a photon 
 
3.1.2 Classical Bit and Quantum Bit  
In the classical world, the value of a classical bit can only have two options, 
either 0 or 1, which are represented by the presence or absence of a voltage in 
analog systems. It is obvious that a classical bit can not be both 0 and 1 at the 
same time, since a voltage can not be both present and absent at the same time.  
In order to distinguish the bit in the quantum world from the bit in the 
classical world, we call the bit in the quantum world a quantum bit, or a Qubit 
for short. A qubit has a totally different story when it comes to its value. A qubit 
can have numerous values, compared to the classical bit, which can only have 
one of the two options. Mathematically, a qubit is represented by a vector 























The definition of a qubit: A qubit is a quantum systemQwhose state lies in a 
two-dimensional Hilbert spaceH [77]. Here we consider a 2-state quantum 
system, where there are only two possible results in experiments, for example, 
the vertical polarization and horizontal polarization states. A general quantum 
state is a linear complex combination of the two basic polarization states, the 
vertical and horizontal polarization states. We denot  the vertical polarization 
state by↑ , the horizontal polarization state by→ , and then a general quantum 
state can be represented by 
↑+→= βαϕ ,     (3.2) 
where ,1,,
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Figure 3.3 provides a straightforward view of the relationship between a 







Figure 3.3 A general quantum state 
 
3.2 Basis of Quantum Cryptography 
3.2.1 Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle 
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is one of the most important theorems on 
which quantum cryptography is based. It is formulated by Werner Heisenberg in 
the 1920’s and developed with other people’s contribu ion [81].  
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle can be interpreted as follows: It is 
impossible to get the precise position and velocity of a particle simultaneously. 
For example, if you increase the accuracy of measuring the position of a particle, 
then you inevitably reduce the accuracy of measuring the velocity of that 
particle at the same time, and vice versa. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle 
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not only applies to the position and velocity of a p rticle, but also to other 
quantum properties that do not commute to each other. Here “do not commute”, 
mathematically, means BAAB ≠ , where A and B represent two quantum 
properties. In quantum cryptography, the polarization state of a photon is often 
used, and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle tells us that it is impossible to 
get a precise measurement result of an unknown polarization state along two 
different polarization axes. We will see examples of the application of the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in the BB84 protocl to be addressed later on. 
  
3.2.2 No-Cloning Theorem 
The No-Cloning Theorem is another most important theorem on which quantum 
cryptography is based. It was discovered by William Wootters, Wojciech Zurek, 
and Dennis Dieks in 1982 [82, 83].  
The No-Cloning Theorem tells us that it is impossible to create an identical 
copy of an arbitrary unknown quantum state. For example, if you want to copy a 
quantum state on a qubit but you do not know the quantum state on that qubit in 
the first place, you will not be able to get a faithful copy of that quantum state. 
There are two reasons causing this impossibility of identically copying an 
unknown quantum state, which are as follows:  
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1. If you copy an unknown quantum state on a qubit, the quantum state 
changes as soon as you try to copy it, and the quantum state you get is 
different from the original quantum state. In addition, when you copy the 
quantum state, the qubit (polarized single photon) bearing the quantum 
state is also destroyed; and 
2. You can make a faithful copy of a quantum state on a qubit only if you 
know the quantum state already. If you do not know the quantum state, 
then you will not be able to get an identical copy of it. This is like a 
deadlock, where you are required to know the quantum state before 
making a copy; however, not knowing the quantum state is the 
motivation of this copying action, which obviously conflicts to each 
other and cannot be solved anyway.  
In quantum cryptography, the reason that the two communicating entities are 
able to detect whether an eavesdropper has eavesdroppe  n the message or not 
is due to the No-Cloning Theorem, which guarantees that if an eavesdropper 
eavesdrops on the message, then the receiver of themessage will get a different 
message from what the sender has sent, so that later on after comparing their 
messages, the sender and receiver will notice the confli ts in the messages, from 
which they can deduce that the eavesdropper has eavesdropped on the message. 
The reason that the receiver will get a different message is that as soon as the 
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eavesdropper copies the quantum state, it is changed to another state that is 
different from the quantum state sent by the sender. 
 
3.2.3 Quantum Measurement 
In a 2-state quantum system, although a quantum state can be a combined 
state ↑+→= βαϕ , when a quantum state is measured, there are only two 
possible results, either the horizontal polarization state or the vertical 
polarization state, with a certain probability, resp ctively. To be more concrete, 
after measuring a general quantum stateϕ , the possibility of getting a 
horizontal polarization state (→ ) is
2
α , and the possibility of getting a vertical 
polarization state (↑ ) is
2
β , where 1
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=+ βα .  






45ο ,    (3.3) 
which is illustrated in Figure 3.4. If you use an optical filter that has a 
polarization axis along the horizontal direction, then the filter will get a 











=α of the time; on the other hand, if 
you use an optical filter that has a polarization axis along the vertical direction, 
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=β of the time. 
In this case, no matter whether you use an optical f lter with a horizontal 
polarization axis or a vertical polarization axis, you can not get an assured 
measurement result, since both results happen with 50% probability. The only 
way that you can get a correct measurement result all the time is to use an 
optical filter with a 45º polarization axis (there is no such a filter naturally, but 
we can manage to get one with the help of additional components, and we will 












Figure 3.4 Measuring a 45º polarization state along the horizontal or vertical 
direction  
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3.2.4 Quantum Entanglement  
Quantum entanglement [26, 84, 85] is a very astonishi g quantum property that 
happens exclusively in the quantum world. There is no counterpart of this 
phenomenon in the classical world. Quantum entanglement is a correlation 
between two quantum systemsA andB , in which when quantum systemA is 
measured, the state of quantum systemB is changed instantaneously, and the 
correlation between the two quantum systems is broken as soon as a 
measurement is made. The measurement results from the fact that two quantum 
systems can be the same, or the opposite, which are referred to as correlated and 
anti-correlated, respectively.  
Let us take the anti-correlated entanglement for example to explain the 
properties of quantum entanglement. Suppose you have two qubits, and you 
know the initial quantum states on them in the first place, for example, a vertical 
polarization state and a 45º polarization state. Through some specific procedures, 
somehow the two qubits become entangled. As soon as the two qubits become 
entangled, the states on them change to some uncertai  states that nobody knows. 
The two qubits do not need to stay together to maintain the entanglement 
between them. They can be separated for an arbitrarily long distance and yet will 
remain entangled. But as soon as one qubit is measured, the quantum state on 
the other qubit is changed instantaneously, and the entanglement between the 
two qubits is broken. If the first person Alice uses a specific measurement and 
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gets a measurement result 1, then the other person Bob must get a 0, which is the 
opposite of 1, if he uses the same measurement as Alice. If Alice gets a 0, then 
Bob has to get a 1. This is called the anti-correlated quantum entanglement of 
the two quantum systems.  
The special characteristic of quantum entanglement ca  be used for quantum 
cryptography to distribute a key with unconditional security. The first quantum 
key distribution protocol making use of quantum entanglement was proposed by 
Artur Ekert in 1991, and the protocol is referred to as the E91 protocol [26]. 
 
3.3 Unconditional Security of Quantum Cryptography 
The essential reason that quantum cryptography can provide unconditional 
security is that it is able to detect whether the eavesdropper has eavesdropped on 
the message or not during the key distribution process, while the conventional 
cryptography does not offer this feature.  
The eavesdropping activity of the eavesdropper inevitably brings disturbances 
to the quantum system, which are treated as noises, and represented by the errors 
in the raw key shared between the two communicating e tities. After Alice 
generates a qubit with a certain quantum state and se s it to Bob, Eve, who is 
the eavesdropper in between, intercepts the qubit and performs a copying 
activity. At the moment when Eve tries to copy the quantum state on the qubit, 
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due to the No-Cloning Theorem, she is not able to get a correct copy of that 
quantum state, if she does not know the quantum state beforehand. According to 
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, after measuring the qubit sent by Alice, 
the quantum state on that qubit collapses to one of the two possible states, for 
example, the vertical polarization state or horizontal polarization state; however, 
neither of which happens with 100% probability, unless the original quantum 
state happens to be a vertical or horizontal polarization. This indicates that after 
the measurement, the quantum state on a qubit is changed to another state that is 
different from the original one. Now, when Bob receives the qubit with a 
different quantum state from the original one and measures it, he will get a 
different measurement result from the original information Alice wanted to 
transmit. Later on, Alice and Bob compare their measurement results, if they 
find a conflict between them, then they can deduce that Eve has been present 
and eavesdropped on the message, so that they discard the message and start the 
key distribution protocol all over again until they can conclude Eve is not 
eavesdropping on the message. This is how quantum cryptography can detect 
the eavesdropping activity of an eavesdropper and provide unconditional 
security.  
On the other hand, let us check the conventional cryptography. Alice sends a 
string of classical bits to Bob; and Eve, who is in between, intercepts or copies 
the classical data. The classical data sent by Alice would not change to other 
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values due to Eve’s eavesdropping activity. After Eve’s copying, the original 
classical data remains the same, and Eve can get the xact value of that original 
data. Then Bob receives the data sent by Alice and eavesdropped on by Eve 
already, and he will still get the same data as Alice. So eventually, Alice, Bob, 
and Eve will all get the same data. Since Alice andBob get the same data, there 
is no way for them to tell whether the eavesdropper has eavesdropped on the 
data or not. Thus the conventional cryptography is not able to provide 
unconditional security as the quantum cryptography does.  
 
3.4 Major Quantum Key Distribution Protocols  
3.4.1 Polarization-Based Quantum Key Distribution Protocol 
The BB84 protocol is the first quantum key distribut on protocol and also the 
most important one. It makes use of the polarization state of a single photon to 
represent a classical bit and then distributes that bit of information from one 
communicating entity to the other. 
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3.4.1.1 Four Polarization States of a Photon  
In this protocol, four polarization states of a photon are used, i.e., vertical 
polarization, horizontal polarization, 45º polarizat on, and 135º polarization, 
Figure 3.5.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Four basic polarization states of a single photon 
 
3.4.1.2 Rectilinear Basis and Diagonal Basis 
Two bases are defined in this protocol: the rectilinear basis, denoted by +; and 
the diagonal basis, denoted by ×. The rectilinear basis represents a coordinate 
system, in which the two axes point to the horizontal and vertical directions 
(Figure 3.6 (a)); and the diagonal basis represents a other coordinate system, in 




Figure 3.6 Rectilinear basis and diagonal basis 
 
3.4.1.3 Measuring Polarized Single Photons with a Polarizing Beam Splitter 
In terms of measuring a qubit with a certain polariz tion state on it, the physical 
meaning of a rectilinear basis is an optical filter with either a vertical 
polarization axis or a horizontal polarization axis that allows a qubit to pass 
along either the vertical direction or the horizontal direction; and the physical 
meaning of a diagonal basis is an optical filter with either a 45º polarization axis 
or a 135º polarization axis (there is no such optical filter by nature, but it can be 
made with the aid of a 45º polarization rotator) that allows a qubit to pass along 
either the 45º direction or the 135º direction.  
A Polarizing Beam Splitter (PBS) is a good representation of the two bases. 
Let us take the polarizing beam splitter with a vertical polarization axis for 
example to illustrate the measurement of a qubit, Figure 3.7.   
44 
(a) A vertically polarized single 
photon passes through the PBS 
with a vertical polarization axis 
(b) A horizontally polarized single 




Figure 3.7 Measuring a vertically polarized single photon and a horizontally 
polarized single photon using a PBS with a vertical polarization axis 
 
A qubit with a vertical polarization state on it passes the PBS with a vertical 
polarization axis with 100% probability. A qubit with a horizontal polarization 
state on it is reflected by the PBS with a vertical po arization axis with 100% 
probability. The probability of passing or being reflected by a PBS with a 
vertical polarization axis is decided by the coefficients of the vector 
representation of the quibt, i.e.,α andβ . According to the vector representation 
of a qubit, ↑+→= βαϕ , a qubit passes the PBS with a vertical polarization 
axis with the probability of
2
β , and it is reflected by the same PBS with the 
probability of
2
α . A qubit with a 45º polarization state on it passes or is 
reflected by a PBS with a vertical polarization axis with equal probabilities, both 
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50%, Figure 3.8, which is why using a PBS with a vertical polarization axis to 
measure a qubit with a 45º or 135º polarization state on it totally randomizes the 
measurement result. On the other hand, it you use a PBS with a 45º polarization 
axis to measure a qubit with a vertical or horizontal polarization state on it, the 
measurement result you can get is also totally random.   
   
 
Figure 3.8 Measuring a 45º polarized single photon usi g a PBS with a vertical 
polarization axis 
 
    Since naturally there is no PBS with a 45º polarization axis, in order to be 
able to measure the polarization states in the diagon l basis, i.e., 45º and 135º 
polarization states, a 45º Polarization Rotator (PR) is needed before the 45º and 
135º polarized single photons enter the PBS, Figure 3.9.   
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(a) A 45º polarized single photon passes 
through the PBS with a vertical 
polarization axis and a 45º polarization 
rotator, and after it passes, its 
polarization state changes to a vertical 
polarization state
(b) A 135º polarized single photon is 
reflected by the PBS with a vertical 
polarization axis and a 45º polarization 
rotator, and after it is reflected, its 





Figure 3.9 Measuring a qubit with a 45º or 135º polarization state with a PBS 
with a vertical polarization axis (with the aid of a 45º polarization rotator) 
 
    After a 45º polarized single photon passing through a 45º polarization rotator, 
it is changed to 90º polarized, which is a vertically polarized single photon. Then 
this vertically polarized single photon passes the PBS with a vertical 
polarization axis with 100% probability. If a single photon detector down the 
passing path detects a click, then it knows that a vertically polarized single 
photon just passed and the original polarization state of that polarized single 
photon is 90º-45º=45º polarization. Similar thing happens to a 135º polarized 
single photon. After the 45º polarization rotator, the 135º polarized single 
photon is changed to a 180º polarized single photon, which is horizontally 
polarized. Then it is reflected by the PBS to the reflecting path, and a single 
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photon detector down the reflecting path clicks. After subtracting 45º, the 
photon detector can get the result of the original polarized single photon, which 
is a 180º-45º=135º polarized single photon. This explains how to measure 
polarized single photons in the diagonal basis using a PBS that has a 
polarization axis in the rectilinear basis.  
 
3.4.1.4 Representation of Classical Bits by Polarized Single Photons  
Two binary values, the classical bits 0 and 1 are used in this protocol, and they 
are represented by polarized single photons according to Table 3.1. For example, 
the binary value 0 can be presented by either a horizontally polarized single 
photon in the rectilinear basis or a 45º polarized single photon in the diagonal 
basis, and it depends on which basis is chosen (either the rectilinear basis or the 
diagonal basis) to decide which polarized single photon to choose. If you choose 
the rectilinear basis, then the classical bit 0 is represented by a horizontally 
polarized single photon; and if you choose the diagon l basis, then it is 
represented by a 45º polarized single photon. The combinations in Table 3.1 can 
be changed to other forms, for example, one can choose to use a vertically 
polarized single photon to represent 0 in the rectilinear basis and still use the 45º 
polarized single photon to represent 0 in the diagon l basis. No matter which 
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form is chosen, the two communicating entities should keep synchronized and 
both be aware of the content of the table.   
 
Table 3.1 Representation of classical bits by polarized single photons  
 
 
3.4.1.5 Schematic Diagram of the Structure of the BB84 Protocol 




Figure 3.10 Schematic diagram of the structure of the BB84 protocol 
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As we can see from Figure 3.10, the two communicating entities, Alice and 
Bob, who wish to establish a secret key between them, are connected by two 
channels, one conventional channel and one quantum channel. The conventional 
channel is a regular telecommunication channel, on which Alice and Bob 
exchange classical information. The quantum channel is an optical fiber, on 
which qubits (polarized single photons) are transmitted from Alice to Bob.  
 
3.4.1.6 Assumptions of the BB84 Protocol 
The assumptions of the BB84 protocol are the following:  
1. Alice and Bob have already authenticated each other somehow before 
the protocol starts;  
2. Eve has access to the conventional channel. She can liste  to the 
conventional channel and get the information flowing on it; however, she 
is not able to change the information on the conventional channel. Eve 
can listen to the quantum channel, intercept a qubit and resend another 
qubit to Bob; and 
3. Eve’s goal is to eavesdrop on the information transmitted between Alice 
and Bob as much as possible without being noticed. To stop Alice and 
Bob from communicating, for example, by cutting offthe conventional 
channel or the quantum channel, is not the goal of the eavesdropper. 
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Otherwise no communication system could work as long as somebody 
keeps destroying the equipment physically.   
 
3.4.1.7 Steps to Share a Raw Key in the BB84 Protocol 
The two communicating entities, Alice and Bob, need to take the following steps 
to share a raw key between them: 
1. Alice generates a sequence of random 0’s and 1’s; 
2. Alice randomly selects one of the two possible bases (+ or ×) for each of 
the bits generated in the first step; 
3. Alice represents the bits generated in the first step using polarized single 
photons according to Table 3.1, and  transmits them through the quantum 
channel; 
4. At Bob’s measuring side, he randomly selects one of the two possible 
bases (+ or ×) for each of the qubits received on the quantum channel 
and measures it; 
5. If Bob selects the same basis as Alice, then he will get the same data as 
Alice’s; and if he selects a different basis from Alice’s, then he will get 
the same data as Alice’s only half of the time; 
51 
6. Bob communicates with Alice through the conventional channel about 
which bases he used to measure the qubits, and Alice tells Bob for which 
qubits he used the wrong bases; and 
7. Alice and Bob delete all the bits for which they used different bases and 
save the rest of the bits as a sequence, which is te raw key shared 
between them.   
Table 3.2 gives us a complete view of the 7 steps of haring a raw key 
between Alice and Bob.  
 
Table 3.2 An example of the BB84 protocol 
Alice







Step 7 1 0






Alice and Bob exchange basis information through the conventional channel
: Correct basis or bit  
     
    Comments on step 5: As explained in Section 3.4.1.3, if Bob uses a rectilinear 
basis (a PBS with a vertical polarization axis) to measure a polarized single 
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photon (45º or 135º polarized) made in a diagonal basis, he will get 0 or 1 with 
equal probability, which is 50%. The same conclusion applies if Bob uses a 
diagonal basis (a PBS with a vertical polarization axis and a 45º polarization 
rotator in front of it) to measure a polarized single photon (vertically or 
horizontally polarized) made in a rectilinear basis, he will also get 0 or 1 with 
equal probability, which is 50%. Because Bob is not sure about the measurement 
result, he and Alice have to discard this bit of information on which they used 
different bases.  
Comments on step 6: Alice’s and Bob’s publicly communicating to each other 
on the conventional channel will not release any information about the random 
bits generated by Alice in the first step or the raw key. The information Alice 
and Bob exchange through the conventional channel is the basis information, 
which explains which bases Bob has used to measure the qubits, and which 
bases Bob has used the same bases as Alice. Since each basis, either the 
rectilinear basis or the diagonal basis, can be used to represent 0 or 1 with equal 
probability, Eve is not able to figure out which bit a certain basis is representing. 
It is equivalent to ask Eve to guess a random number, which she can not guess 
correctly for sure.   
Comments on step 7: The key shared between Alice and Bob is called a raw 
key. If Eve did not eavesdrop on the qubits transmitted by Alice, and the 
transmission of the qubits on the optical fiber was perfect, than there would be 
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no error in the raw key, and this raw key could be us d directly as the final key 
shared between Alice and Bob to encrypt messages. If Eve did eavesdrop on the 
qubits, then there would be some errors in the raw key, which means the raw 
key in Alice’s possession is not exactly the same as the raw key in Bob’s 
possession. In this situation, in order to share an ide tical key between Alice and 
Bob, about which Eve has an arbitrarily low level of knowledge, they need to 
adopt the information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures to 
remove the errors in the raw key and distill a final key out of the raw key. In the 
following, we are going to introduce the two procedures briefly, omitting their 
details.     
 
3.4.1.8 Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification Procedures  
When there are errors in the raw key due to Eve’s eavesdropping or the 
imperfection of the optical fiber (we do not consider the imperfection of the 
optical fiber in this dissertation), the raw key can not be used until the errors 
have been removed and the secrecy of the raw key has been enhanced.  
The information reconciliation procedure is basically an error correction 
process, through which all the errors in the raw key can be removed. The raw 
key with all the errors removed is called a sifted k y, or we may call it an error-
free raw key occasionally.  
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The privacy amplification procedure is basically a h sh function, through 
which a final key is distilled from the sifted key. It is used to reduce Eve’s 
knowledge about the final key to an arbitrarily low level to enhance the secrecy 
of the final key.  
The information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures are very 
time-consuming and effort-consuming. The information reconciliation 
procedure requires a lot of communication overhead between Alice and Bob on 
the conventional channel, as well as a lot of computation overhead at each side. 
Although the privacy amplification is a very importan  procedure to obtain the 
final key; however, it reduces the length of the final key dramatically, which 
indicates a very low efficiency. For example, a 1000-bit raw key, after removing 
150 errors in it, the length of the sifted key becomes 850 bits. After going 
through the privacy amplification procedure, the length of the final key may be 
only 25 bits. It depends on the strength of the hash function algorithm you use 
that how many bits can be left in the final key. For example, the Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) can reduce a sifted key with the length of up to ( 1264 − ) bits 
to a final key with a fixed length of 160 bits [5], which can maximally reduce 
the length of the final key to 1715.1 − of the length of the sifted key.   
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3.4.1.9 Weaknesses of the BB84 protocol 
Although the BB84 protocol can provide unconditional security to the key 
distribution process, it has some drawbacks as well. The biggest drawback is 
that its efficiency of sharing a raw key and a final key is very low. In the BB84 
protocol, Bob can guess the bases used by Alice corr ctly only half of the time, 
so that only half of the bits generated by Alice can be included into the raw key, 
which makes the efficiency of sharing a raw key 50%.  
Since there may be errors in the raw key, Alice andBob need to employ the 
information reconciliation procedure to remove all the errors, which is a 
communication- and computation-consuming process that produces a lot of 
communication overhead and takes a long time to finish. In order to enhance the 
secrecy of the final key, the privacy amplification procedure has to be performed. 
The privacy amplification procedure is a length-devastating process that reduces 
the length of the final key dramatically, which is not desirable.   
Another drawback is the conventional channel used in the structure. A 
conventional channel means two things in terms of drawbacks:  
1. If there is a conventional channel, then the conventional communication 
is needed, which generates a communication overhead as well as the cost; 
and  
2. The conventional channel presents vulnerabilities in the structure, since 
it can be eavesdropped on by Eve without being noticed by Alice and 
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Bob, while the quantum channel does not present this vulnerability. In 
addition, one of the assumptions of the BB84 protocl is that the 
information exchange between Alice and Bob on the conventional 
channel can not be changed, which puts a strong requirement on the 
application of the BB84 protocol.  
One more drawback is that the BB84 protocol assumes that Alice and Bob 
have already authenticated each other before the protocol starts, which leaves 
the protocol an incomplete one with a strong restriction.   
In addition, the BB84 protocol does not have effectiv  mechanisms to defend 
against Eve’s eavesdropping attack. All it has is apassive way to detect Eve’s 
presence during the key distribution process after th  protocol has finished 
running once.  
Aiming at the weaknesses of the BB84 protocol, we should improve the 
protocol in the following aspects: 
1. Improving the efficiency of sharing a raw key and a fin l key, in terms of 
a faster convergence speed of the keys and a lower communication and 
computation overheads; 
2. Introducing effective detection mechanisms of Eve’s avesdropping 
activity, and further proposing effective defense mchanisms to frustrate 
Eve’s attack;  
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3. Removing the basis information exchange between Alice and Bob on the 
conventional channel, and further eliminating the ncessity of the 
conventional channel in the structure, so that the communication 
overhead and cost are reduced, and the vulnerability coming from the 
conventional channel as a classical element is remov d; and  
4. Providing authentication for the two communicating entities at the 
beginning of the protocol.    
 
3.4.2 Entanglement-Based Quantum Key Distribution Protocol 
In 1991 Artur Ekert proposed the first quantum key distribution protocol making 
use of the phenomenon of quantum entanglement [26],and the protocol is 
referred to as the E91 protocol. The basic idea behind t is entanglement-based 
quantum key distribution protocol is that if Alice and Bob use the same way to 
measure the entangled photon pair, then they will get exactly the opposite 
measurement results, so that they can share a secret k y.  
Figure 3.11 shows the schematic diagram of the structu e of the E91 protocol. 
Alice and Bob are connected by two channels, one conventional channel, on 
which classical information is exchanged, and one quantum channel, on which 
one of the two photons in an entangled photon pair is t ansmitted to Bob. The 
entangled photon pair generator is used to generate ntangled photon pairs, and 
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one photon in an entangled photon pair is transmitted o Alice and the other 
transmitted to Bob.  
 
 
Figure 3.11 Schematic diagram of the structure of the E91 protocol 
 
Alice and Bob need to take the following steps to share a raw key: 
1. Alice generates an entangled photon pair, keeps one of the two photons 
in the pair with her and transmits the other photon to Bob through the 
quantum channel; 
2. Alice randomly selects one of the two possible bases (+ or ×) to measure 
her qubit, and saves the measurement result; 
3. Bob randomly selects one of the two possible bases (+ or ×) to measure 
his qubit, and saves the measurement result; 
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4. If Alice and Bob select the same bases, then they will have exactly the 
opposite measurement results; if Bob selects a different basis from 
Alice’s, then the measurement result he gets is totally random, and later 
on that measurement result will be discarded; 
5. Bob communicates with Alice through the conventional channel about 
which basis he used to measure his qubit, and Alice tells Bob whether he 
has used the same basis as she; 
6. Alice and Bob discard all the bits on which they used different bases, and 
save the rest of the bits in a sequence, respectively; and 
7. Bob reverses the bit value of his sequence, after which his sequence is 
the same as Alice’s, and that sequence is the raw key shared between 
Alice and Bob.  
    After Alice and Bob share the raw key, they need to go through the 
information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures to get a final 
key. From there on, the E91 protocol shares the same procedures as the BB84 
protocol.  
 
3.4.3 Other Major Quantum Key Distribution Protocols 
In 1991 Charles Bennett proposed a quantum key distribution protocol that 
made use of two arbitrary nonorthogonal quantum state  to distribute a key [27]. 
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Charles Bennett, Gilles Brassard, and David Mermin presented a quantum key 
distribution protocol making use of the quantum entanglement without Bell’s 
Theorem in 1992 [28], which is simpler than the E91 protocol and equivalent to 
the BB84 protocol. Instead of using either the polarization state of a photon or 
an entangled photon pair to distribute a key, Kyo In ue, Edo Waks, and 
Yoshihisa Yamamoto used the phase difference between two pulses of a photon 
to carry a bit information and distribute a key, which is more suitable for the 
transmission in fibers [29]. In 2006, Subhash Kak proposed a three-stage 
quantum cryptography protocol to distribute a key, in which the communication 
remains quantum in each stage [30]. Some discussions on the Kak’s three-stage 
protocol are available in references [86-90].     
   
3.5 Quantum Key Distribution in Practices  
Quantum key distribution techniques have evolved very fast recently. On April 
21, 2004, the world’s first bank transfer using entanglement-based quantum key 
distribution took place in Vienna [65]. The Mayor of the Vienna City sent an 
online wire transfer from the Vienna City Hall to the headquarter of Bank-
Austria Creditanstalt. The record of free-space quantum key distribution was 
achieved in 2006 between the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife via a 
satellite based optical free-space link, and an entangled photon pair was 
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transmitted over a distance of 144 km [91]. The longest fiber quatnum key 
distribution was accomplished by Los Alamos National Laboratory and National 
Institute of Standards and Technology together in 2006. They were able to 
transmit a photon using phase-coding quantum key distribution method over 
148.7 km [92].  
Commercial products of quantum key distribution are vailable on the market 
already, which so far are used more in military than in business. The four 
companies that are offering quantum key distribution products are: a Swiss 
company called “id Quantique” [93], a U.S. company amed “MagiQ 
Technologies” [94], a French company “SmartQuantum” [95], and an Australian 
company “QuintessenceLabs Pty Ltd” [96].    
 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter we introduced the basis of quantum cryptography, including the 
polarization state of light, qubits, the two primary theorems on which quantum 
cryptography is based, i.e., the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the No-
Cloning Theorem, and the very astonishing quantum property – quantum 
entanglement. We explained the unconditional security provided by quantum 
cryptography, and introduced several major quantum key distribution protocols, 
with the emphasis on the first quantum key distribuion protocol, the BB84 
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protocol, and the first entanglement-base quantum key distribution protocol – 
the E91 protocol, followed by the achievements of quantum key distribution 
techniques in practices. Within the introduction of the BB84 protocol, we 
elaborated the details in many aspects, including the two bases used in the 
protocol, namely, the rectilinear basis and the diagon l basis, the representation 
of classical bits by polarized single photons, how t  measure polarized single 
photons using a polarizing beam splitter, the structure of the protocol, the 
assumptions it requires, the steps to share a raw key and obtain a final key, the 
weaknesses of the protocol, and what should be doneto improve the efficiency 













Chapter 4 Key Distribution Using a Dual-Quantum Channel 
4.1 Introduction 
As we discussed in Chapter 3, the BB84 protocol has a very low efficiency in 
getting a raw key and a final key, and it does not have effective defense 
mechanisms against Eve’s eavesdropping attack. Here the “low efficiency” 
means that it takes a long time, a high communication overheard and 
computation overhead to only get a short final key. Aiming at the low efficiency 
problem of the BB84 protocol, in this chapter, we pr sent a method to speed up 
the convergence process of the final key at a lower cost and yet provide a better 
defense mechanism against Eve, making use of a dual-quantum channel 
structure and a complementary measuring basis selection rule.  
 
4.2 Dual-Quantum Channel Structure 
The schematic diagram of the structure of the quantum key distribution protocol 
to be presented in this chapter is shown in Figure 4.1. 
In the proposed structure, two communicating entities, Alice and Bob, who 
wish to establish a secret key between them, are connected by three channels, 
one of which is a conventional channel, and the other wo of which are two 
quantum channels. The two quantum channels are referred to as a dual-quantum 
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channel. The conventional channel is just a regular telecommunication channel, 
which is used to exchange classical information betwe n Alice and Bob. The 
dual-quantum channel is composed of two optical fibers, on which qubits are 
transmitted from Alice to Bob.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Schematic diagram of the structure of the proposed protocol 
 
4.3 Complementary Measuring Bases  
In the BB84 protocol, at Bob’s measuring side, he randomly chooses one of the 
two possible bases (+ or ×) for each of the qubits received on the quantum 
channel. In this protocol, we have two quantum channels, and how to take 
advantage of the channel diversity offered by the dual-quantum channel and 
choose bases for the dual-quantum channel becomes a critic l issue. In this 
section, we introduce a technique called “complementary measuring basis 
selection rule”.  
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    Since the two bases used in this protocol cover all the four polarization states 
of a photon, with each basis covering two orthogonal polarization states, these 
two bases are said to be complementary to each other. Instead of using randomly 
selected measuring bases on both of the two quantum channels, which makes the 
two quantum channels independent of each other, we use randomly chosen bases 
on one quantum channel, and use the complementary bses on the other 
quantum channel on purpose. In doing so, the two independent quantum 
channels correlate to each other and form a dual-quntum channel. An example 
of the complementary bases used by Bob on the dual-quantum channel is shown 
in Table 4.1.  
 




    For example, if Bob randomly chooses the rectilinear basis (+) for the first 
qubit on quantum channel 1, then he uses, on purpose, the complementary basis, 
i.e., the diagonal basis (×) for the first qubit on quantum channel 2, and so forth.  
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4.4 The Proposed Protocol 
In the proposed protocol, the definitions of the bases and the representation of 
classical bits by polarized single photons remain the same as in the BB84 
protocol. Alice and Bob need to take the following steps to share a raw key 
between them: 
1. Alice generates a sequence of random 0’s and 1’s; 
2. Alice randomly chooses one of the two possible bases (+ or ×) for each 
of the bits generated in step 1; 
3. According to the basis selected, Alice represents each of the random bits 
by two polarized single photons with identical polariz tion states 
according to Table 3.1 and sends each of the polarized single photons on 
one of the two quantum channels. For example, for a bit 1 and a 
rectilinear basis, Alice generates two vertically polarized single photons 
and transmits one photon on quantum channel 1 and the o her on 
quantum channel 2; 
4. At Bob’s measuring side, he adopts the complementary measuring basis 
selection rule to select bases and measure the qubits received on the two 
quantum channels. He randomly selects one of the two possible bases (+ 
or ×) to measure the polarized single photon receivd on quantum 
channel 1, and for the corresponding polarized single photon received on 
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quantum channel 2, he uses, on purpose, the complementary basis of the 
basis used on quantum channel 1 to measure it;  
5. Bob communicates with Alice through the conventional channel about 
which basis he used to measure each of the polarized single photons on 
quantum channel 1, and Alice tells Bob for which qubit he used the same 
basis as she; for those qubits Bob used different bases from Alice’s on 
quantum channel 1, he knows that on quantum channel 2 h  must have 
used the same bases as Alice, since he chose the complementary bases 
on quantum channel 2. For example, if Bob chooses th  diagonal basis (×) 
to measure the polarized single photon on quantum channel 1, and he is 
told by Alice that the diagonal basis is different from hers, then he can 
deduce that the complementary basis, i.e., the rectilin ar basis (+) used 
by him on quantum channel 2 must coincide with Alice’s basis; and  
6. Bob saves the measurement results of the qubits on which he used the 
same bases as Alice on the two quantum channels, and discards the rest 
of the measurement results on which he used different bases from 
Alice’s. The saved measurement results form a sequence, which is the 
raw key shared between Alice and Bob.  
As explained before, if Alice and Bob use different bases on a bit/qubit, then 
they will share the same information only half of the time, which is why this bit 
of information can not be included into the raw key and has to be discarded. 
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Only the qubit on which they use the same bases can yield the same bit of 
information for both Alice and Bob, and only in this situation can the bit of 
information be saved into the raw key.  
So far, Alice and Bob finish the process of sharing a raw key. If the 
eavesdropper, Eve, was not present during the key distribution process, then the 
raw keys shared between Alice and Bob would be exactly the same; however, if 
Eve was present during the key distribution process, then the raw keys shared 
between Alice and Bob would not be exactly the same, with some of the bits 
differing from each other. In this case, the information reconciliation and 
privacy amplification procedures need to be adopted to istill a final key from 
the raw key, about which Eve has an arbitrarily low level knowledge. An 











Table 4.2 An example of the proposed protocol 
Alice
















Step 6 1 1 0 0
0 or 1
0 or 1 0 or 1
0 or 10 or 10 or 1







QC1, 2: Quantum Channel 1, 2; : Correct basis or bit  
 
4.5 Raw Key Efficiency, Final Key Efficiency, and Raw Key 
Error Rate  
In order to evaluate how efficiently a protocol can obtain a raw key and a final 
key from the original random bits generated by Alice, we define two parameters, 
raw key efficiency and final key efficiency. Raw key fficiency is defined as the 
length of the raw key shared by Alice and Bob divided by the length of the 
original random bits generated by Alice. Final key efficiency is defined as the 
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length of the final secret key (after all necessary p ocedures) divided by the 
length of the original random bits generated by Alice.  
    In order to describe how well the raw key in Alice’s possession accords with 
the raw key in Bob’s possession, we extend the definition of “error rate” in the 
circumstance of the raw key. The raw key error rateis defined as the length of 
the erroneous bits (those bits in the raw keys that are different between Alice 
and Bob) in the raw key divided by the length of the raw key. The erroneous bits 
in the raw key could be caused by the imperfection of the quantum channel, or 
the eavesdropping activity of the eavesdropper. In this dissertation we mainly 
consider the impact caused by Eve’s eavesdropping activity.    
 
4.6 Raw Key Efficiency and Raw Key Error Rate in Different 
Scenarios with or without the Presence of Eve 
In the following, we are going to analyze the raw key efficiency and raw key 
error rate under several different scenarios classified according to whether Eve 
is present or not, on either or both of the two quant m channels. Three different 
scenarios apply:  
1. Eve is not present on either of the two quantum channels;  
2. Eve is present on one of the two quantum channels; and  
3. Eve is present on both of the two quantum channels. 
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4.6.1 Eve is not Present on Either of the Two Quantum Channels  
In this case, we can break down the entire key distribution process into two parts, 
with each part being one quantum channel, and analyze them one by one.  
On quantum channel 1, for a bit transmitted by Alice, Bob randomly chooses 
one of the two bases to measure that qubit, and he has 50% of the probability of 
choosing the same basis as Alice and getting the sam  bit as Alice’s. On average, 
on quantum channel 1, Alice and Bob end up with sharing 50% of the original 
random bits as their raw key.  
On quantum channel 2, because Bob uses the complementary bases to 
measure the qubits, for those qubits which he did not choose the same bases as 
Alice on quantum channel 1, he would choose the same bases as Alice on 
quantum channel 2. This includes the remaining 50% of the original random bits 
generated by Alice into the raw key. So totally, from the two quantum channels, 
Alice and Bob end up with sharing 100% of the original random bits as their raw 
key, with each quantum channel contributing to 50% of the final raw key, which 
makes the raw key efficiency 100%.  
Regarding the raw key error rate, if Eve is not present on either of the two 
quantum channels, then there would be no errors in the raw key, thus the raw 
key error rate is 0%. 
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4.6.2 Eve is Present on One of the Two Quantum Channels 
When Eve is present during the key distribution process, she may have access to 
only one quantum channel or she may choose to eavesdrop on only one quantum 
channel to avoid being detected by Alice and Bob. Let us suppose Eve is 
eavesdropping on quantum channel 2.  
According to the analysis in Section 4.6.1, if Eve is not present on quantum 
channel 1, then Alice and Bob will end up with sharing 50% of the original 
random bits as their raw key from quantum channel 1, and there will be no error 
in that part of raw key obtained from quantum channel 1 due to the absence of 
Eve. So the raw key efficiency and raw key error rate on quantum channel 1 are 
50% and 0%, respectively.  
Now let us consider the situation that Eve is present on quantum channel 2. 
The fact that Bob’s bases on quantum channel 2 will still coincide with Alice’s 
for the other 50% of the original random bits, no matter whether Eve is present 
or not, is not changed. What is changed is the raw key error rate due to Eve’s 
presence, since her eavesdropping activity can bring errors into the raw key 
obtained from quantum channel 2. The maximal raw key error rate Eve can 
bring into the raw key obtained from quantum channel 2 is 25%, if she 
eavesdrops on all the other 50% of the original random bits on quantum channel 
2, which is explained in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3 The maximal raw key error rate Eve can bri g into the raw key is 25% 
when Eve eavesdrops on all the qubits transmitted on a quantum channel 
 
 
For a bit of the raw key obtained from quantum channel 2, Eve has 50% 
probability of choosing the same basis as Alice andBob, and in this case, Eve 
does not bring any error into the raw key. However, since Eve also has another 
50% probability of choosing a different basis from Alice’s and Bob’s, after she 
measures and resends her qubit to Bob, Bob measures it with a different basis 
and gets either a 0 or 1 with 50% probability, respectively. This means with a 
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different basis, Bob gets a 0 or 1 randomly. Eventually, from Table 4.3 we can 
figure out that the probability that Bob gets a 0 instead of the supposed 1 is 25%, 
and that is the maximal error rate Eve can bring into a raw key by her 
eavesdropping activity. So the maximal raw key error rate on quantum channel 2 
is 25%.  
When combining the two quantum channels together and co sidering them as 
a whole, the raw key efficiency becomes 50%+50%=100% and the average raw 
key error rate is equal to 0%*50%+25%*50%=(0%+25%)/2=12.5%. 
 
4.6.3 Eve is Present on Both of the Two Quantum Channels 
When Eve is present on quantum channel 1, according to the analysis in Section 
4.6.2, the raw key efficiency and maximal raw key error rate are 50% and 25%, 
respectively. It is the same on quantum channel 2 when Eve is present, with the 
raw key efficiency and maximal raw key error rate bing 50% and 25%, 
respectively. So in all, when Eve is present on both of the two quantum channels, 




4.7 Making Use of the Difference between the Two Raw Key 
Error Rates on the Two Quantum Channels to Speed up the Key 
Distribution Process and Frustrate Eve 
We can take advantage of the channel diversity brought by the dual-quantum 
channel structure to speed up the process of obtaining the final key and better 
frustrate Eve.  
If Eve is not present during the key distribution process at all, then there 
would be no errors in the raw key, and hence this raw key can be used directly 
as the final key to encrypt messages. Sometimes, Eve may be eavesdropping on 
both of the two quantum channels, bringing a maximum of 25% errors into the 
raw key. In this case, the information reconciliation and privacy amplification 
procedures need to be adopted to remove the errors in the raw key and distill a 
final key from the raw key. However, as analyzed before, this process is very 
effort-consuming and has very low efficiency. Only a very small size of the final 
key can be obtained after the information reconciliation and privacy 
amplification procedures.  
Sometimes Eve may not have access to both of the two quantum channels, so 
she only eavesdrops on one quantum channel, or she may choose to eavesdrop 
on only one quantum channel to try to avoid being detected by Alice and Bob. If 
Alice and Bob could find out that, during a certain period of time, the raw key 
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error rate on one quantum channel is significantly lower (it is also possible that 
the raw key error rate is 0%, which gives Alice and Bob an even greater 
advantage) than that on the other quantum channel, then they can take advantage 
of this situation by using the measurement results only on the quantum channel 
where the raw key error rate is lower (or 0%), and keep sending decoy 
information on the other quantum channel where there is a higher raw key error 
rate and Eve is actively eavesdropping. By doing so, Alice and Bob can have the 
benefit that the processing time of obtaining the sifted key through the 
information reconciliation procedure is much shorter by using a raw key with a 
lower error rate. The reason is simply that less work is needed by the 
information reconciliation procedure when dealing with a raw key with a lower 
error rate. Ideally, if the raw key error rate on oe quantum channel is 0%, 
which means that Eve does not eavesdrop on that channel t all, then all the 
measurement results from that quantum channel can be used directly as the final 
key, without even going through the tedious information reconciliation and 
privacy amplification procedures. In this case, the final key can be achieved in a 
much faster way, and the length of the final key is much longer than if the 
privacy amplification procedure is deployed. At the same time, Alice and Bob 
keep sending decoy information on the other quantum channel on which Eve is 
focusing on eavesdropping, so that Eve’s attention is drawn to the decoy 
quantum channel instead of the quantum channel that is actually transmitting the 
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real information, Figure 4.2. As a result, Eve’s eavesdropping attempt is 
restricted within the decoy quantum channel and her eavesdropping attack is 
effectively frustrated.   
 
 
Figure 4.2 Transmitting decoy information on the quant m channel on which 
Eve is actively eavesdropping while sending real information on the other 
quantum channel on which Eve is not eavesdropping 
 
4.8 Making Use of an Initialization Vector Shared between Alice 
and Bob to Improve the Convergence Speed of the Final Key and 
Frustrate Eve 
We introduce an initialization vector (IV) shared between Alice and Bob to help 
speed up the key distribution process as well as deter Eve. We show that, with 
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the aid of an initialization vector, Alice and Bob can obtain the final key in a 
much faster way and have a better defense against Eve’s attacks.  
The raw key error rate can be calculated either as an average of the two 
quantum channels or separately as described in Section 4.7. It does not matter 
how the raw key error rate is calculated. After Alice and Bob get the raw key, 
they adopt the information reconciliation procedure to obtain a sifted key. After 
getting the sifted key, instead of proceeding to the next step as usual, i.e., the 
privacy amplification procedure, Alice and Bob simply XOR the sifted key with 
the initialization vector shared between them, and the result of the XOR 
operation is the final key, Figure 4.3.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Obtaining the final key by XORing the sifted key with the 
initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob 
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As we know, the privacy amplification procedure is a very tedious process 
that reduces the length of the final key dramatically. Since it is not deployed 
here, the length of the final key obtained is the same as the length of the sifted 
key, which is usually a little shorter than the length of the raw key, however, 
may be hundreds of times, if not thousands, longer than that of the final key if 
the privacy amplification procedure is deployed. And since the privacy 
amplification procedure is not deployed, the final key can be obtained much 
faster. Further, since Eve has absolutely no knowledge about the initialization 
vector shared between Alice and Bob, she would not have any knowledge about 
the final key either. This way, Eve is effectively frustrated. 
 
4.9 Security Analysis and Solutions 
Just like the BB84 protocol and all the other quantm key distribution protocols, 
the proposed protocol is also subject to the eavesdropping attack. During the 
eavesdropping attack, Eve not only brings errors into the raw key, but also gains 
some information about the raw key. In order to reduce or even eliminate Eve’s 
knowledge about the raw key, several methods can be adopted. 
First, we can set up a threshold for the error rateof the raw key shared 
between Alice and Bob. From previous analysis we notice that if Eve is present 
on only one quantum channel, then she will bring a maximum of 12.5% errors to 
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the raw key. Thus we may set the threshold at 12.5%. If Alice and Bob find out 
that 12.5% or more of the raw key is in error after comparison, they discard the 
raw key and start the proposed protocol all over again until they get a raw key 
with an error rate that is lower than the threshold, Figure 4.4. This way, Alice 
and Bob can detect Eve’s presence and prevent Eve from knowing too much 
information about the raw key. In practice, when we consider the imperfection 
of the transmission of the qubits on the quantum channels, we need to set the 
threshold to a lower value to compensate the impact on the raw key error rate 
that is caused by the imperfect transmission, since the error rate we really want 
to deal with is the one caused bye Eve’s eavesdropping activity, not the one 
caused by the imperfect transmission.     
If the raw key passes the threshold test, then Alice and Bob are pretty sure 
that either Eve was not present on the quantum channels, or she only 
eavesdropped on a part of the bits transmitted by Alice during her presence. In 
this case, we know that Eve may get partial knowledge of the raw key, but not to 
a significant extent. Even so, we still want to further reduce Eve’s knowledge 
about the raw key to an even lower level to provide higher confidence. In order 
to achieve this goal, Alice and Bob need to adopt the information reconciliation 
and privacy amplification procedures to distill a final key out of the raw key, 




Figure 4.4 Comparing the raw key error rate with the preset threshold to decide 
whether a raw key should be kept or discarded 
 
Since there are two quantum channels in the proposed protocol, Eve may not 
have access to both of the two quantum channels at a certain time or she may 
choose to eavesdrop on only one quantum channel inst ad of two to avoid being 
detected by Alice and Bob. If Eve is eavesdropping o  only one quantum 
channel and leaves the other one intact, then by comparing the raw key error 
rates on the two quantum channels, Alice and Bob can figure out on which 
quantum channel Eve is eavesdropping and on which se is not eavesdropping. 
In this situation, Alice and Bob can keep sending decoy information on the 
quantum channel that is being eavesdropped on by Eve to attract her attention, 
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and sending real information on the other quantum channel, on which Eve is not 
eavesdropping. By doing so, Eve’s eavesdropping attack can be easily frustrated. 
    Compared to deploying the privacy amplification procedure to eliminate 
Eve’s knowledge about the final key, Alice and Bob can adopt a better solution, 
which is to make use of the initialization vector shared between them to obtain 
the final key in a much faster, and much more efficient way, while at the same 
time frustrate Eve’s eavesdropping attack effectively. After getting the raw key, 
Alice and Bob perform the information reconciliation procedure to remove the 
errors in the raw key and get the sifted key, then t y simply XOR the sifted key 
with the initialization vector to obtain the final key. Since the initialization 
vector is shared and known to only Alice and Bob, about which Eve does not 
have any knowledge, she would not be able to get any knowledge about the final 
key either. This way, the tedious and length-devastating privacy amplification 
procedure is skipped, which not only results in a faster and securer way to obtain 
the final key, but also increases the length of the final key dramatically. In other 
words, the convergence speed as well as the efficiency of obtaining the final key 
is greatly improved.    
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4.10 Comparison to the BB84 Protocol 
4.10.1 Differences between the Proposed Protocol and the BB84 Protocol 
The proposed protocol differs from the BB84 protocol in the following aspects:  
1. The proposed protocol uses two quantum channels (a dual-quantum 
channel) to transmit qubits, while the BB84 protocol uses only one 
quantum channel;  
2. In the proposed protocol, for each of the random bits generated by Alice, 
she uses two polarized single photons with identical polarization states, 
each transmitted through one of the two quantum channels, while in the 
BB84 protocol, only one polarized single photon is used for each bit; and  
3. In the proposed protocol, at Bob’s measuring side, he performs two 
complementary measurements on the two quantum channels using two 
complementary measuring bases, while in the BB84 protocol, only one 
random measuring basis is used on the only quantum channel. 
Due to the special structure and the diversity brought by the dual-quantum 
channel, the proposed protocol offers a much better performance than the BB84 
protocol, in terms of the efficiency of getting the final key, and the ability to 
counter Eve’s attack.  
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4.10.2 Performance Comparison between the Proposed Protocol and the 
BB84 Protocol 
In the BB84 protocol, Bob chooses the same bases as Alice only half of the time, 
which results in that only 50% of the bits generated by Alice are included into 
the raw key, making the raw key efficiency 50%. While in the proposed protocol, 
with the aid of the dual-quantum channel structure and the complementary 
measuring basis selection rule on the two quantum channels, all the bits 
generated by Alice can be included into the raw key, making the raw key 
efficiency 100%, which is twice as much as that of the BB84 protocol.  
As for the raw key error rate, the maximal raw key error rate of the BB84 
protocol, due to Eve’s presence, is 25%, while the maximal raw key error rate of 
the proposed protocol can be 12.5% or 25%, according to how many channels 
Eve is eavesdropping on. In general, the proposed protocol has a lower raw key 
error rate than that of the BB84 protocol. Table 4.4 gives a clear comparison 
about the raw key error rates of the two protocols in different situations.   
    Compared to the BB84 protocol, the proposed protocol obtains the final key 
in a much faster and securer manner, and the length of e final key is much 
longer. In addition, the proposed protocol has the ability to effectively defend 
against Eve and frustrate her attacks. The techniques we use in the proposed 
protocol are the following: comparing the raw key error rates on the two 
quantum channels and using the one with a lower rat key error rate to distill a 
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final key; sending decoy information on the quantum channel on which Eve is 
eavesdropping to fool her, while getting the final key directly from the other 
eavesdropping-free quantum channel; and XORing the sift d key with the 
initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob t  obtain a secure final key, 
about which Eve does not have any knowledge. All these features offered by the 
proposed protocol are not available to the BB84 protocol.   
 
Table 4.4 Comparison of the raw key error rate in different scenarios between 




The BB84 protocol has a low raw key efficiency, a very low final key efficiency 
and a high raw key error rate. In this chapter we presented a new quantum key 
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distribution protocol using a dual-quantum channel and a complementary 
measuring basis selection rule to improve the raw key efficiency, the final key 
efficiency, and reduce the raw key error rate. It was proved that the proposed 
protocol offers a much higher raw key efficiency and a lower raw key error rate 
than those of the BB84 protocol. We analyzed different scenarios according to 
whether Eve is present or not during the key distribu ion process. We proposed 
several techniques to eliminate Eve’s knowledge about the raw key and the final 
key to frustrate her attacks. With the techniques pr sented in this chapter, Alice 
and Bob share a much longer final key in a much faster, ecurer way than the 













Chapter 5 Quantum Key Distribution Using a Novel Basis 
Selection Rule 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we introduced the dual-quantum channel structure and 
complementary measuring bases used by Bob on the two quantum channels to 
improve the efficiency of the key distribution process. In this chapter, we will 
present a new quantum key distribution protocol to improve the convergence 
speed of the final key and effectively deter Eve by using a novel basis selection 
rule on the dual-quantum channel with the aid of an initialization vector shared 
between Alice and Bob. The structure of this protocl follows the one presented 
in Chapter 4, but in addition to that, Alice and Bob are required to have an 
Initialization Vector (IV) shared between them, Figure 5.1.  
 





Figure 5.1 Schematic diagram of the structure of the proposed protocol 
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5.2 A Novel Basis Selection Rule on the Dual-Quantum Channel 
With the aid of an initialization vector shared betw en them, Alice and Bob 
make a prior agreement about how to select bases on the two quantum channels. 
Alice and Bob can agree that for the bit 1 in the initialization vector, Alice 
would randomly choose one of the two possible bases for each of the bits on 
quantum channel 1, and use the same random basis on quantum channel 2; and 
Bob would randomly choose a basis for each of the polarized single photons 
received on quantum channel 1, and use the complementary basis on quantum 
channel 2. The basis selection for the bit 0 in the initialization vector is the 
opposite of bit 1 on the two quantum channels, which is as follows: Alice would 
randomly choose one of the two possible bases for each of the bits on quantum 
channel 1, and use the complementary basis on quantum channel 2; and Bob 
would randomly choose a basis for each of the polarized single photons received 
on quantum channel 1, and use the same random basis on quantum channel 2. 
The basis selection on the two quantum channels according to the value of the 






Table 5.1 Basis selection on the dual-quantum channel according to the value of 
the initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob 
 
5.3 The Proposed Protocol 
Alice and Bob need to take the following steps to share a raw key, making use 
of the basis selection rule with the aid of an initialization vector shared between 
them:  
1. Alice generates a sequence of random 0’s and 1’s; 
2. For each of the bits generated in the first step, Alice selects two bases, 
one for quantum channel 1, and the other for quantum channel 2, 
according to the corresponding bit value in the initialization vector 
(Table 5.1);  
3. Alice represents each of the bits by two polarized single photons 
according to the bases selected in the second step and the representation 
of bits by polarized single photons as introduced in Table 3.1, and sends 
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one polarized single photon on quantum channel 1, and the other on 
quantum channel 2;   
4. Bob selects a measuring basis for each of the qubits received on quantum 
channel 1 and quantum channel 2, respectively, according to the 
corresponding bit value in the initialization vector (Table 5.1), and 
measures the polarized single photons;  
5. Bob communicates with Alice through the conventional channel about 
which basis he used to measure each of the polarized single photons on 
quantum channel 1, and Alice tells Bob for which qubits he used the 
same basis as she; and Bob can deduce, for which qubits on quantum 
channel 2 he has selected the same basis as Alice, ac ording to the bit 
values of the initialization vector; and 
6. Bob saves all the measurement results for which he used the same bases 
as Alice on the two quantum channels in a sequence, and that sequence is 
the raw key shared between them. 







Table 5.2 An example of the proposed protocol 
Alice
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Step 2/
QC2
: Correct basis or bitQC1, 2: Quantum Channel 1, 2;  
 
5.4 Raw Key Efficiency  
The raw key efficiency of this protocol is 100%. It is guaranteed in this protocol 
that all of the random bits generated by Alice are included into the raw key, with 
each of the two quantum channels contributing to half of the raw key. This is 
realized by the novel selection rule of the bases on the two quantum channels. 
From Table 5.2 we can find out that, no matter what t e bit value of the 
initialization vector is, it is ensured that on one of the two quantum channels, 
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there is one pair of bases, and only one pair, that will coincide. For example, if 
the bit value of the initialization vector is 1, Alice randomly selects the 
rectilinear basis (+) for quantum channel 1 and uses th  same random basis, 
which is the rectilinear basis (+), for quantum channel 2, and Bob randomly 
selects the diagonal basis (×) for quantum channel 1 and uses the 
complementary basis, which is the rectilinear basis (+), for quantum channels 2, 
then there is a coincidence on quantum channel 2, since both of them select the 
rectilinear basis. This way, there has to be a basis co ncidence for each bit, 
happening either on quantum channel 1 or on quantum channel 2, which 
guarantees the 100% raw key efficiency.  
 
5.5 Raw Key Error Rate  
According to whether Eve is present or not, on either or both of the two quantum 
channels, there are three different scenarios that determine the raw key error rate: 
1. Eve is not present on either of the two quantum channels;  
2. Eve is present on one of the two quantum channels; and  
3. Eve is present on both of the two quantum channels.  
In the following, we are going to analyze the three sc narios one by one.  
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5.5.1 Eve is not Present on either of the Two Quantum Channels 
If Eve is not present during the key distribution process, then there would be no 
error in the raw key, hence the raw key error rate is 0%. 
 
5.5.2 Eve is Present on One of the Two Quantum Channels 
When Eve is present on one of the two quantum channels, for example, on 
quantum channel 1, her presence would bring a maximum of 25% errors into the 
part of the raw key obtained from quantum channel 1. Since Eve is not present 
on quantum channel 2, that part of the raw key obtained from quantum channel 
2 is error-free. Because each quantum channel contributes to half of the final 
raw key, on average, Eve’s presence on one quantum channel would bring a 
maximum of 25%*50%+0%*50%=(25%+0%)/2=12.5% errors into the final raw 
key, which results in a 12.5% raw key error rate. 
 
5.5.3 Eve is Present on both of the Two Quantum Channels 
When Eve is present on both of the two quantum channels, the maximal raw key 
error rate on each quantum channel is 25%, thus the average raw key error rate 
on the two quantum channels is 25%, maximally.    
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5.6 Three Ways to Obtain the Final Key 
In this protocol, there are three ways to obtain the final key:  
1. Distilling the final key from the raw key by going through the 




Figure 5.2 Distilling the final key from the raw key by going through the 
information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures 
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2. Figuring out on which quantum channel Eve is not eavesdropping by 
looking into the raw key error rates on the two quant m channels, and 
getting the final key directly from the eavesdropping-free quantum 
channel (previously shown in Figure 4.2);  
3. Comparing the difference between the two raw key error rates on the two 
quantum channels, and getting the final key from the quantum channel 
with a significantly lower raw key error rate by adopting the information 
reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures, Figure 5.3; and 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Comparing the difference between the two raw key error rates on the 
two quantum channels and picking the raw key with a lower error rate to obtain 
the final key 
 
4. XORing the sifted key with the initialization vector shared between 
Alice and Bob to obtain the final key (previously shown in Figure 4.3).  
The first way is the standard method used to obtain the final key after Alice 
and Bob get the raw key from the two quantum channels. Usually this method 
96 
takes a long time and much effort to obtain the final key, and the length of the 
final key is very small. Thus this method is a low efficiency solution of getting 
the final key. 
Since this protocol provides channel diversity between Alice and Bob, they 
can use the second and the third method to obtain the final key in a faster 
manner. If Eve is present on only one of the two quant m channels, then the part 
of raw key obtained from the quantum channel on which Eve is not present is 
error-free and can be used directly as the final key. This can be realized by 
calculating the raw key error rates on the two quant m channels respectively and 
finding out on which quantum channel Eve is not eavesdropping. If the 
information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure are not used to 
get the final key, the speed of getting the final key will be much faster, and the 
effort needed to get the final key is much smaller as well. Even if Eve is present 
on both of the two quantum channels, using the standard method to distill the 
final key from the quantum channel with a significantly lower raw key error rate 
is still much faster than in the normal situation, because less error-correcting 
work is needed for a raw key with a significant lower error rate.  
In the fourth way, Alice and Bob can take advantage of the initialization 
vector shared between them to obtain the final key in a much faster and securer 
manner. After Alice and Bob get the raw key, they perform the information 
reconciliation procedure to remove the errors in the raw key and get the sifted 
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key, and then they XOR the sifted key with the initialization vector to obtain the 
final key. Since the privacy amplification procedure is not adopted, the 
convergence speed of the final key is improved, and the length of the final key is 
kept the same as the length of the sifted key, which is much longer than that of 
the final key if the privacy amplification procedure is adopted. Since Eve does 
not have any knowledge about the initialization vector shared between Alice and 
Bob, she is not able to get any knowledge about the final key either. Thus, by 
using this method, Alice and Bob can get a longer, s curer final key in much a 
faster way, while Eve can be effectively frustrated at the same time.   
 
5.7 Two Ways to Frustrate Eve’s Attack  
The proposed protocol offers two effective methods to frustrate Eve’s attack, 
which are realized by the usage of a decoy quantum channel, and an 
initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob.  
Since sometimes Eve may not be able to eavesdrop on both of the two 
quantum channels, or she may choose to eavesdrop on only one quantum 
channel strategically, Alice and Bob can figure outn which quantum channel 
Eve is actively eavesdropping by comparing the raw key error rates on the two 
quantum channels. After finding out on which quantum channel Eve is actively 
eavesdropping, Alice and Bob keep sending decoy information on that quantum 
98 
channel and switch the real information on the other quantum channel on which 
she is not tampering with. This way, the information Eve gets is just some fake 
information, the real information is protected, and Eve’s attack is countered.  
As we mentioned before, the final key can be achieved by XORing the sifted 
key with the initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob. Since Eve does 
not have any knowledge about the initialization vector, she would not have any 
knowledge about the final key either. This way, Eve’s attempt to get the final 
key is effectively frustrated.  
 
5.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduced a new quantum key distribution protocol that 
takes advantage of a novel basis selection rule on the two quantum channels 
with the aid of an initialization vector shared betw en Alice and Bob and the 
dual-quantum channel structure to improve the effici n y of the key distribution 
process, the security of the final key, and effectively frustrate Eve. The basis 
selection rule and the dual-quantum channel structue make sure that all the 
random bits generated by Alice in the first step are included into the raw key, 
which makes the raw key efficiency 100%. The final key is obtained in a much 
faster and securer way by using the initialization vector shared between Alice 
and Bob. Eve’s attack can be effectively defeated in th s protocol by using the 
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stratagem of fooling Eve with a decoy quantum channel a d the initialization 
















Chapter 6 Quantum Key Distribution without Basis Information 
Exchange and the Usage of the Conventional Channel 
6.1 Introduction 
As we know the conventional channel has been an indispensable component of 
all the quantum key distribution protocols that have ever been proposed so far, 
on which classical information regarding the bases used by Alice and Bob and 
the error correction process of the raw key is transmitted. In this chapter, we are 
going to introduce a new quantum key distribution protocol in which the basis 
information exchange on the conventional channel is removed, and further the 
necessity of the conventional channel in the structure is eliminated. In doing so, 
the communication overhead is avoided, and the entire structure of the proposed 
protocol becomes all-quantum, presenting less vulnerability than the traditional 
structure with a classical element (the conventional ch nnel) in it.  
   
6.2 Roles of the Conventional Channel 
In quantum key distribution protocols, the conventio al channel is used for the 
following two purposes:  
1. The conventional channel is used to exchange basis information between 
Alice and Bob. After Bob finishes measuring the qubits received on the 
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two quantum channels, he needs to tell Alice which basis he used to 
measure each of the qubits on the two quantum channels through the 
conventional channel, and then through the same conventional channel, 
Alice tells Bob which bases he used are the same as hers. After this 
communication on the conventional channel, both Alice and Bob know 
exactly for which quibts they have used the same basis, so that they can 
save those bits as the raw key and delete the rest of the bits for which 
they have used different bases; and  
2. After Alice and Bob share the raw key, they need to check whether Eve 
has eavesdropped on the raw key during the key distribution process. 
This is realized by checking if there are any errors in the raw key. If 
there are errors in the raw key, then they can conclude that Eve was 
present during the key distribution process. And according to how high 
the raw key error rate is, they decide whether to keep this raw key or 
discard it. Basically what they need to do is to send to each other a small 
portion of the raw key in each person’s possession, for example, the first 
50 bits of the raw key, and compare the portion received from the other 
person with their own to see if there is any inconsistency. If there is an 
inconsistency in the raw key, namely, error, they conclude that Eve has 
eavesdropped on the raw key. Then they make an estimation of the raw 
key error rate by calculating the error rate of the portion they exchanged, 
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and compare the value of the estimated raw key error rate with the 
threshold set up beforehand to decide whether they s ould discard or 
keep the raw key. If the raw key error rate is lower than the threshold, 
then they keep the raw key and go thought the error correction process to 
remove all the errors in the remaining portion of the raw key, which also 
needs the conventional channel to transmit classical information between 
them. After they remove all the errors in the raw key, they do not need 
the conventional channel any more, since the privacy mplification 
procedure can be finished on their own without exchanging any 
information. 
The benefit of the elimination of the basis information exchange on the 
conventional channel is obvious. Since the basis information exchange is not 
needed, the communication overhead is reduced greatly. And the further 
elimination of the necessity of the conventional channel in the structure not only 
totally removes the communication overhead, but also makes the entire structure 
all-quantum, which are very beneficial to Alice and Bob. That is because only 
the quantum structure is able to detect Eve’s eavesdropping activity, while the 
classical structure can not, so that the all-quantum structure is less vulnerable to 
the eavesdropping attack than the hybrid structure (st ucture with both classical 
and quantum elements in it).   
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6.3 The Proposed Protocol 
In this section we are going to present a new quantum key distribution protocol 
in which the basis information exchange is not needed during the key 
distribution process, and further we will discuss the elimination of the necessity 
of the conventional channel in the structure.  
The basic structure of the proposed protocol follows the previous structure, 
Figure 6.1. Since the conventional channel is eliminable, we use the bold dashed 
line to represent the dispensable conventional channel.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Schematic diagram of the structure of the proposed protocol 
 
Before the protocol starts, Alice and Bob need to make an agreement on the 
selection of the bases on the two quantum channels according to the bit value of 
the initialization vector shared between them. For example, they may agree that 
for the bit 1 in the initialization vector, they choose the rectilinear basis for 
quantum channel 1 and the diagonal basis for quantum channel 2; and for the bit 
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0 in the initialization vector, they choose the diagonal basis for quantum channel 
1 and the rectilinear basis for quantum channel 2. Since Alice and Bob share the 
same initialization vector, they know exactly which bases the other person uses 
on the two quantum channels. The selection of bases u d on the two quantum 
channels according to the bit value of the initializ tion vector is summarized in 
Table 6.1.    
 
Table 6.1 Selection of bases on the two quantum channels according to the bit 
value of the initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob 
  
 
    Alice and Bob need to take the following steps to hare a raw key: 
1. Alice generates a sequence of random 0’s and 1’s; 
2. Alice chooses the bases for each of the bits generated in the first step for 
the two quantum channels according to the value of the corresponding 
bit in the initialization vector (Table 6.1); 
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3. According to the representation of bits by polarized single photons 
(Table 3.1), Alice generates two polarized single photons for each of the 
bits generated in the first step using the bases sel cted in the second step 
and transmits the polarized single photons through quantum channel 1 
and quantum channel 2, respectively;  
4. At Bob’s measuring side, he chooses the basis for each of the qubits 
received on the two quantum channels according to the value of the 
corresponding bit in the initialization vector (Table 6.1); and since Bob 
shares the same initialization vector with Alice, h uses exactly the same 
bases as Alice on both of the two quantum channels; 
5. Bob uses the bases selected in step 4 to measure the polarized single 
photons received on the two quantum channels; and  
6. Bob saves the measurement results in a sequence as th  raw key.  
    An example of the proposed protocol is shown in Table 6.2. 
    So far the conventional channel has not been usd yet. Since Alice and Bob 
know exactly which bases the other person uses, the basis information exchange 
between them is not necessary. The conventional channel is also used for the 
error correction of the raw key, and we will show how to eliminate the error 
correction procedure and further eliminate the usage of the conventional channel 
in the structure later on.   
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Table 6.2 An example of the proposed protocol 
Alice




































QC1, 2: Quantum Channel 1, 2; : Correct basis or bit  
 
6.4 Raw Key Efficiency and Raw Key Error Rate 
The raw key efficiency of this protocol is 100%. The reason is that Alice and 
Bob both use exactly the same bases as the other person on the two quantum 
channels, thus all the bits generated by Alice are included into the raw key. 
Since Alice and Bob both know exactly which bases the other person uses, there 
is no need for them to exchange basis information through the conventional 
channel as usual.  
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Similar to the analyses in the previous chapters, during the key distribution 
process, Eve may or may not be present, on one or both of the two quantum 
channels. So three different scenarios apply:  
1. Eve is not present during the key distribution process. If Eve is not 
present, then there would be no errors in the raw key, which makes the 
raw key error rate 0%, and the raw key automatically becomes the final 
key shared between Alice and Bob; 
2. Eve is present on one quantum channel. If Eve is pre ent on only one 
quantum channel, then the maximal raw key error rate she can bring into 
the raw key obtained from that quantum channel is 25%, and the error 
rate of the other raw key obtained from the other quantum channel on 
which Eve is not present is 0%. Since both Alice and Bob use exactly the 
same bases on the two quantum channels, there are two coincidences of 
basis on the two quantum channels, so that the two measurement results 
on the two quantum channels for a specific bit should be the same. 
However, due to Eve’s eavesdropping, 25% of the bits in the two raw 
keys obtained from the two quantum channels are diff rent. For those 
25% bits that are different from each other, Bob has to pick up a bit from 
a quantum channel as the raw key, where he has 50% of probability 
picking up a wrong bit, which makes the maximal aver g  raw key error 
rate on the two quantum channels 25%*50%=12.5%; and  
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3. Eve is present on both of the two quantum channels. If Eve is present on 
both of the two quantum channels, then the maximal raw key error rates 
on the two quantum channels are both 25%. From the above analysis in 
Scenario 2, when the measurement results on the two quantum channels 
are different, Bob has 50% of probability of choosing the wrong bit. 
Now, suppose that in the 25% errors of the raw key obtained on quantum 
channel 1, there are%X that are the same as the 25% errors of the raw 
key obtained on quantum channel 2, where 250 ≤≤ X , then the maximal 















6.5 Four Ways to Obtain the Final Key 
The three ways to obtain the final key introduced in the precious chapters can 
also be used in this protocol. Here we just summarize them briefly: 
1. Using the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification 
procedures to distill a final key out of the raw key; 
2. Comparing the raw key error rates on the two quantum channels 
respectively, finding out the quantum channel with a significantly lower 
raw key error rate, and using the measurement results on that quantum 
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channel by going through the information reconciliation and privacy 
amplification procedures to distill a final key; 
3. Figuring out on which quantum channel Eve is not eavesdropping by 
calculating the raw key error rates on the two quant m channels, and 
using the raw key from the eavesdropping-free quantum channel directly 
as the final key; and   
4. XORing the sifted key with the initialization vector shared between 
Alice and Bob to obtain the final key. 
    The benefits of the four methods as introduced earlier still apply to this 
protocol, such as a faster convergence speed of the inal key, a securer and 
longer final key, and effectively frustrating Eve’s attacks.   
   
6.6 Two Ways to Frustrate Eve’s Attack 
The two ways mentioned in Chapter 5 to frustrate Ev’s attack can also be used 
in this protocol, which are as follows:  
1. Transmitting decoy information on the quantum channel o  which Eve is 
actively eavesdropping and sending real information on the other 
quantum channel on which Eve omits or chooses not to eavesdrop; and  
2. XORing the sifted key with the initialization vector shared between 
Alice and Bob to get the final key and frustrate Eve. 
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6.7 Real-Time Detection Mechanisms of Eve’s Presence during 
the Key Distribution Process 
Besides the two ways to frustrate Eve’s attack mentioned in Section 6.6, there 
are three additional detection mechanisms in this protocol that are able to detect 
Eve’s presence in real time:  
1. If Eve is present during the key distribution process, she would bring 
errors into Bob’s measurement results on the two quantum channels, 
which generally will make the two corresponding measurement results 
on the two quantum channel differ from each other. Bob would notice 
the conflict between the two measurement results on the two quantum 
channels when he has to decide which one of the two measurement 
results to choose as the raw key. As soon as Bob notices this conflict, he 
knows Eve is present, Figure 6.2. For example, for a random bit 1 
generated by Alice and transmitted on the two quantum channels as two 
polarized single photons, due to Eve’s interference, Bob may get a 1 on 
quantum channel 1 and a 0 on quantum channel 2. If this situation 
happens, then Bob will not know which one of the measurement results 





Figure 6.2 Comparing the measurement results on the two quantum channel to 
detect whether Eve is eavesdropping 
 
2. The availability of an initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob 
leads to an easy way to detect whether Eve is present or not in real time. 
Instead of generating a sequence of random 0’s and 1’s in the first step, 
Alice uses the initialization vector shared between h r and Bob as the 
random sequence, and then they follow the steps 2-6 as introduced above. 
As soon as Bob receives a qubit, measures it, and gets the measurement 
result, he compares it with the corresponding bit in the initialization 
vector, if he notices any conflict, the he knows Eve is present, Figure 6.3. 
Because he knows he is supposed to get a measurement result that is the 
same as the corresponding bit in the initialization vector, if he does not 
get it, the only reason is Eve’s interference. So he can conclude that Eve 
is eavesdropping at that moment.  
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Figure 6.3 Alice transmitting the initialization vector to Bob and Bob comparing 
the measurement results with the initialization vector to detect whether Eve is 
eavesdropping 
 
3. In order to make it even harder for Eve to guess when Alice and Bob are 
transmitting the initialization vector, they may choose to transmit it 
sporadically in a random order at random moments intead of 
transmitting the entire initialization vector in the normal order at the 
beginning. For example, Alice and Bob may transmit the bits of the 
initialization vector in a random order at random moments that are 
determined by a secret algorithm known to only thems lves. Since there 
is no way for Eve to figure out at which moments and i  which order 
Alice and Bob transmit the bits of the initialization vector, by no means 
she can avoid being detected if she is really eavesdropping. This 
mechanism provides a real-time detection of Eve’s presence, because as 
soon as at a certain moment Bob finds a conflict bewe n his 
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measurement results and the initialization vector, he knows Eve is 
present.      
 
6.8 Eliminating the Basis Information Exchange between Alice 
and Bob on the Convention Channel 
It is a necessary step in all the quantum key distribution protocols proposed 
before this protocol for Alice and Bob to communicate with each other about the 
bases used by them on the two quantum channels, so that they can decide which 
bits should be discarded and which bits should be included into the raw key. 
However the basis information exchange is not needed in this protocol, which 
saves a great deal of communication overhead. This is realized by using the 
initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob and the basis selection rule 
adopted in this protocol. Since Alice and Bob share the initialization vector with 
each other, and they have a prior agreement on how to select the bases on the 
two quantum channels according to the bit value of the initialization vector, they 
know exactly which bases the other person uses on the two quantum channels, 
thus they do not need to communicate with each other about the basis 
information through the conventional channel as usual. This way, the basis 
information exchange on the conventional channel is removed.   
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6.9 Eliminating the Necessity of the Conventional Channel in the 
Structure  
As introduced before, one of the purposes of the conventional channel is to 
exchange basis information between Alice and Bob, which we have proved its 
unnecessity in the proposed protocol; and the other purpose of the conventional 
channel is to figure out the error rate of the raw key and remove the errors in it. 
Now if Alice and Bob can figure it out that there is no error in the raw key, then 
the conventional channel can be eliminated. After eliminating the conventional 
channel, the structure of the proposed protocol becom s all-quantum, which 
means there is no classical element, such as a convention channel, in the 
structure. The all-quantum structure has the unique advantage over the hybrid 
structure with classical elements in term of security, because only the quantum 
structure can detect Eve’s eavesdropping activity, while the classical structure 
cannot. So the all-quantum structure presents less vulnerabilities than the 
classical structure and the hybrid structure. 
In order to eliminate the conventional channel, Alice and Bob need to be able 
to figure out that the raw key error rate is 0% during a period of time so that no 
error correction is needed through the communication on the conventional 
channel. The real-time detection mechanisms of Eve’s presence presented in 
Section 6.7 give a very good preparation to achieve this goal. Since Alice and 
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Bob can detect Eve’s presence in real time, they know exactly when Eve is not 
eavesdropping in real time. If Eve is not eavesdropping, then there is no error in 
the raw key, the error correction procedure on the conventional channel is not 
needed, so that the conventional channel can be eliminated. If there is no error in 
the raw key, then the raw key can be used directly as the final key to encrypt 
messages. In this case, the communication overhead is removed, the 
conventional channel is eliminated, the convergence speed of the final key is 
improved, and Eve’s attack is effectively frustrated.  
 
6.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduced a new quantum key distribution protocol that 
makes use of the dual-quantum channel structure and the basis selection rule 
with the aid of an initialization vector shared betw en Alice and Bob. We 
showed that the basis information exchange on the conventional channel is not 
needed, which reduces the communication overhead greatly. In the proposed 
protocol we discussed four ways to obtain the final key, and two ways to 
frustrate Eve’s eavesdropping attack. In addition to that, we presented three real-
time detect mechanisms of Eve’s presence during the key distribution process, 
which further enables the elimination of the necessity of the conventional 
channel in the structure. The proposed protocol removed the basis information 
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exchange between Alice and Bob, eliminated the usage of the conventional 
channel in the structure, and turned the structure of the proposed protocol into an 
all-quantum structure. The proposed protocol was able to obtain the final key in 
a much faster, securer way while at the same time frustrated Eve’s attacks 
effectively without the communication overhead and the conventional channel 












Chapter 7 Defense Mechanisms to Eve’s Attack  
7.1 Introduction 
The BB84 is a protocol to distribute a secret key from Alice to Bob, with the 
ability to detect whether Eve has eavesdropped or not during the key distribution 
process after the protocol has finished running once. It does not have a strong 
defense mechanism to frustrate Eve’s attack rather than just passively detecting 
Eve’s eavesdropping after a round of the running of the protocol. In this 
dissertation, we have presented several techniques that can be used to not only 
detect Eve’s eavesdropping in real time, but also actively counter Eve’s attack 
on Alice’s and Bob’s own initiative. In this chapter, we consider from the 
defender’s perspective on how to thwart Eve’s attack by adding more 
randomnesses and unpredictabilities into the proposed protocols, such as, time, 
location, wavelength, order, content, and so on. We address several techniques 
that can effectively deter Eve’s attack, and together with previously presented 
techniques, the integrated defense mechanism offers a much stronger capability 
to actively and effectively frustrate Eve’s attack, which enhances the security of 
the key distribution process.   
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7.2 Several Techniques to Frustrate Eve’s Attack 
7.2.1 Changing the Representation of Bits by Polarized Single Photons 
Before a protocol starts, Alice and Bob need to make n agreement on the 
representation of bits by polarized single photons. The representation we use in 
this dissertation is shown in Table 7.1 (a). The agreement can be public to the 
eavesdropper, however in order to better frustrate Eve, Alice and Bob can make 
a secret agreement between them that is not publicized. There are totally four 
different forms to represent the classical bits by polarized single photons, Table 
7.1. Now, instead of making use of only one publicly known representation, 
Alice and Bob can actually use the four secret representations in a random 
sequence for a random period of time, all decided by a secret algorithm known 
to only themselves. For example, Alice and Bob may use Table 7.1 (b) for 3 
seconds, then use Table 7.1 (d) for 8.2 seconds, then switch to Table 7.1 (a) for 
1.8 seconds, and then use Table 7.1 (c) for 15 seconds. Since Eve does not know 
the sequence of the representations, the content of the representation being used, 
as well as the duration of a certain representation, here is no way for Eve to 
figure out the meaning of her measurement results. To Eve, the measurement 
results do not mean anything but some random information. This way, Eve is 
effectively frustrated.     
 
119 

























7.2.2 Using the Decoy Quantum Channel to Transmit Fake Information 
When Eve is eavesdropping during the key distribution process, she may be only 
present on one quantum channel while leave the other intact. In this situation, 
Alice and Bob can pretend to be transmitting real information on the quantum 
channel on which Eve is actively eavesdropping, however in fact transmit real 
information on the other quantum channel on which Eve is not eavesdropping. 
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The decoy information on the decoy quantum channel can draw Eve’s attention 
and keep her focusing on the decoy quantum channel. This way Eve is fooled 
and the real information is protected. Alice and Bob can judge on which 
quantum channel Eve is eavesdropping by calculating and comparing the raw 
key error rates on the two quantum channels.  
  
7.2.3 Locating the Two Quantum Channels in Different Optical Fibers  or 
Optical Fiber Cables 
The two quantum channels do not have to use one optical fiber or one optical 
fiber cable, although putting the two quantum channels in a single optical fiber 
cable is difficult enough already for Eve to locate th  two quantum channels, 
since an optical fiber cable can have up to a thousand optical fibers in it. In order 
to better puzzle Eve, the two quantum channels can be located at different 
optical fiber cables, which makes it even more difficult for Eve to be able to 
locate the dual-quantum channel. If Eve can not locate the dual-quantum 
channel, then she can not launch successful attacks against them.  
    Further, if the situation with many optical fibers or optical fiber cables and a 
switch is available, then Alice and Bob can make usof the programmable 
switch to change the connections between fibers or cables, Figure 7.1. The 
connections inside the switch is decided by a secret algorithm shared and known 
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to only Alice and Bob, about which Eve does not have ny knowledge. The 
connections in the switch change randomly and last for a random period of time. 
So Eve would not be able to find out which fiber (cable) is switched to which 
fiber (cable). For example, quantum channel 1 may be connected to fiber 3 
(cable 3) for 5 seconds, and then it is switched to fiber 4 (cable 4) for 4 seconds, 
and so forth. Quantum channel 2 can also be switched to other fibers or cables 
randomly. Since Eve is not able to locate the two quantum channels, it is 
impossible for her to launch a successful attack against them.       
 
 
Figure 7.1 Changing the locations of the two quantum channels 
 
7.2.4 Assigning the Two Quantum Channels with Different Wavelengths 
By introducing the Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) [97] technology 
into quantum key distribution, we can assign quantum channel 1 and quantum 
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channel 2 with two different wavelengths according to the secret algorithm 
shared and known to only Alice and Bob, Figure 7.2.For example, for a random 
period of time, wavelength2w may be assigned to quantum channel 1, and for 
another random period of time, wavelength4w may be assigned to quantum 
channel 1, and so on. Quantum channel 2 can be assigned with a random 
wavelength for a random period of time in the same way. Since there is no way 
for Eve to find out at a certain moment which wavelength is corresponding to 
which quantum channel, there is no way for her to launch a successful attack 
against the quantum channels.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Assigning different wavelengths to the two quantum channels 
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7.2.5 Using the Initialization Vector Shared between Alice and Bob  
In this dissertation, the initialization vector is u ed to XOR with the sifted key to 
obtain the final key, and to be transmitted instead of the randomly generated bits 
to detect Eve’s presence in real time. Since the initialization vector is an initial 
secret shared and known to only Alice and Bob, about which Eve does not have 
any knowledge, any operations that are decided by the initialization is known to 
only Alice and Bob themselves. Eve is not able to get any information without 
knowing the initialization vector, thus her attack is effectively frustrated.  
 
7.2.6 Transmitting the Initialization Vector in a Random Manner 
In Chapter 6 we presented a method to detect Eve’s pre ence in real time. 
Instead of transmitting the bits in the initialization vector in regular order, Alice 
and Bob can use the secret algorithm shared and known t  only themselves to 
decide the sequence of the bits in the initialization vector to be sent, and the 
random moment to send a certain bit. Since the bits are sent at random moments 
in a random order, there is no way for Eve to figure out the situation. If Eve is 
really eavesdropping on the information transmitted between Alice and Bob, 
then there is no way for her to be able to avoid beng detected by them. This way, 
Eve’s eavesdropping activity is detected in real time, and Alice and Bob can 
adopt eluding or defending mechanisms to thwart her attack accordingly.   
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7.2.7 Introducing a Random Delay between the Transmissions on the Two 
Quantum Channels 
Although as implied in the proposed protocols in this dissertation, the two 
polarized single photons that are corresponding to a certain random bit 
generated by Alice in the first step are transmitted at the same time on the two 
quantum channels, they can be transmitted at different moments, with a random 
delay between the transmissions on the two quantum channels. This enhances 
the security of the key distribution process.  
    If Eve does not know which two qubits are the two corresponding to a certain 
random bit generated by Alice, then she loses the opportunity to get additional 
information from the correlation of the two qubits, which is useful to launch a 
successful attack. For example, Alice may start transmitting a qubit on quantum 
channel 1 at a moment, while delay the transmission of the corresponding qubit 
on quantum channel 2 by a random period of time, for example, 6.2 seconds. 
This way, Eve can not figure out which two qubits are in a pair, so that she is not 
able to launch a successful attack against the two corresponding qubits.  
  
7.3 Integrated Defense Mechanism to Eve’s Attack 
Each of the techniques mentioned above is a good mechanism to defend against 
Eve’s attack. Additionally, these mechanisms can be us d together to form an 
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integrated defense mechanism that provides a much stronger defending 
performance against Eve’s attack. Several randomnesses and unpredictabilities 
are involved and combined together, such as time, location, wavelength, order, 
content, and so on, which make it extremely difficult for Eve to be able to figure 
out what is going on with the two quantum channels and the qubits transmitted 
on them. The secret algorithm shared between Alice and Bob can be just an 
algorithm that generates random values, and according to the random values 
generated, Alice and Bob choose how to manipulate tim , location, wavelength, 
order, content, and so on.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we presented several techniques that can effectively frustrate 
Eve’s attack, and by using the integrated defense mechanism, it is even harder 
for Eve to be able to launch successful attacks. The idea behind these techniques 
is to introduce more randomnesses and unpredictabilities into the protocols, such 
that Eve can not figure out what is really happening between Alice and Bob on 
the two quantum channels, hence she is not able to aunch successful attack 




Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusions 
The BB84 protocol is a key distribution protocol that is able to provide 
unconditional security to the key distribution process. However this protocol is a 
very low efficient protocol in terms of sharing a rw key and the convergence 
speed of obtaining a final key. In addition, the BB84 protocol does not have an 
effective countermeasure to defend against Eve’s attack except for passively 
detecting whether Eve has eavesdropped or not after one ound of the running of 
the protocol. It is vulnerable to Eve’s eavesdropping attack.  
In this dissertation, we mainly focused on two things: How to improve the 
efficiency of sharing a raw key and a final key, and how to effectively frustrate 
Eve. Three protocols were proposed in this dissertation, offering much better 
performances than the BB84 protocol. They have a much higher raw key 
efficiency, they can obtain the final key in a much faster and securer way, they 
can keep the length of the final key the same as the length of the sifted key, 
which is much longer than what the BB84 protocol can obtain, and they can 
effectively deter Eve’s attack. Overall, the proposed protocols provided a highly 
efficient and highly temper-resistant key distributon.  
In the protocol proposed in Chapter 4, we introduce a dual-quantum channel 
structure and complementary measuring bases of Bob on the dual-quantum 
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channel. With the dual-quantum channel and the comple entary measuring 
bases, the raw key efficiency is increased from 50% to 100%, which is a huge 
improvement over the BB84 protocol. The raw key error ate of this protocol is 
generally lower than that of the BB84 protocol, and ccording to whether Eve is 
present or not, on either or both of the two quantum channels, we analyzed three 
different scenarios with three different raw key error rates. Due to the channel 
diversity brought by the dual-quantum channel structure, the raw key error rates 
on the two quantum channels can be calculated respectively and compared 
afterwards, which offers an effective method to elud  and frustrate Eve’s 
eavesdropping attack. With this feature, Alice and Bob can figure out on which 
quantum channel Eve is actively eavesdropping and on which quantum channel 
Eve is not, so that they keep sending decoy information on the quantum channel 
on which Eve is actively eavesdropping to attract her attention, while at the 
same time sending real information on the other quantum channel on which Eve 
is not eavesdropping. This way, Eve is fooled, and ll the information she gets is 
just some garbage information. Because Eve is not touching the other quantum 
channel, the raw key obtained from that quantum channel is error-free and can 
be used directly as the final key without going through the tedious information 
reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures, providing a much faster 
way to obtain the final key. In addition, by XORing the sifted key with the 
initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob and known only to 
128 
themselves, the final key can be achieved in a much faster, securer, and more 
efficient way. Since Eve does not have any knowledge about the initialization 
vector, she is not able to get any knowledge about the final key either, thus Eve 
is effectively frustrated.  
In Chapter 5 we proposed a quantum key distribution protocol that adopted a 
novel basis selection rule with the aid of an initialization vector shared between 
Alice and Bob. According to the value of the bits in the initialization vector, 
Alice and Bob make a prior agreement on how to select the bases on the two 
quantum channels. This selection rule is formed in a way such that all the 
random bits generated by Alice in the first step of the protocol are included into 
the raw key, making the raw key efficiency 100%. Since it employed the same 
dual-quantum channel structure as the protocol present d in Chapter 4, the same 
scenarios regarding the raw key error rate applied. We presented four ways to 
obtain the final key in this protocol: going through the standard information 
reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures to obtain the final key, 
comparing the two raw key error rates on the two quant m channels and using 
the one with a significantly lower error rate to get the final key by going through 
the information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures, using the 
raw key obtained from the eavesdropping-free quantum channel directly as the 
final key, and XORing the sifted key with the initialization vector shared 
between Alice and Bob to get the final key. We also pr posed two ways to 
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frustrate Eve’s attack in this protocol: sending decoy information on the 
quantum channel on which Eve is actively eavesdropping, and using the 
initialization vector to eliminate Eve’s knowledge about the final key. Since Eve 
does not have any knowledge about the initialization vector shared between 
Alice and Bob, she does not have any knowledge about the final key either. Due 
to these reasons, Eve is not able to launch successful attacks, thus she is 
effectively deterred.  
In Chapter 6 we proposed a quantum key distribution protocol in which the 
basis information exchange between Alice and Bob on the conventional channel 
is not needed, and further the necessity of the conventional channel in the 
structure is eliminated. In this protocol, the initial zation vector shared between 
Alice and Bob is used to decide the bases used by Alice and Bob on the two 
quantum channels. Since Alice and Bob use exactly the same bases on the two 
quantum channels, they do not need to communicate with each other about the 
basis information through the conventional channel, which significantly reduces 
the communication overhead. The methods used to obtain the final key and 
frustrate Eve mentioned in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are also applicable to this 
protocol. Besides those methods, we introduced three detection mechanisms that 
are able to detect Eve’s presence in real time in this protocol. With the help of 
the real-time detection mechanisms, Alice and Bob can respond to Eve’s attack 
in a time-efficient manner so that they can better defend against Eve. Given the 
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ability of detecting Eve’s presence in real time, this protocol eliminates the 
necessity of the conventional channel between Alice and Bob, which makes the 
entire structure all-quantum. This all-quantum structure not only means much 
lower communication overhead, but also indicates less vulnerabilities, since 
only the quantum structure is able to detect Eve’s eavesdropping, while the 
classical structure and the hybrid structure are not able to do so.  
In Chapter 7, we proposed several methods to import m e randomnesses and 
unpredictabilities into the protocols to thwart Eve’s attack. We introduced 
several the following techniques: randomizing the representation of bits by 
polarized single photons, using a decoy quantum channel to transmit fake 
information to Eve, changing the locations of the two quantum channels, 
assigning different wavelengths to the two quantum channels, making use of the 
initialization vector shared between Alice and Bob, randomizing the sequence 
and moments of the bits in the initialization vector to be transmitted to Bob, and 
employing a random delay between the transmissions on the two quantum 
channels. Each technique increases the difficulty for Eve to launch a successful 
attack, and with all the techniques combined together as an integrated defense 
mechanism, it is extremely difficult for Eve to be able to launch a successful 
attack, hence she is effectively frustrated.     
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8.2 Future Work 
This dissertation has led to several thoughts for the future research work in 
quantum cryptography. First, the authentication problem in quantum key 
distribution is still an open problem. It is a universal assumption that before 
Alice and Bob start the key distribution protocol, they have already 
authenticated each other. In most of the time, the authentication between the two 
communicating entities is realized by physical means or conventional 
authenticating techniques, but some research has started focusing on finding a 
quantum way to authenticate Alice and Bob [42-60]. Quantum digital signature 
is another emerging direction to solve the authentication and non-repudiation 
problem in quantum key distribution [98, 99].  
Second, another assumption in the quantum key distribution protocols is that 
although Eve can copy the classical information trasmitted on the conventional 
channel, she is not able to modify the classical information. This indicates that 
where there is a classical element in the structure, here are vulnerabilities and 
restrictions. So fully eliminating all the classical elements in the key distribution 
process is a great idea to not only reduce communication overhead, but also 
more importantly, remove the restrictions and the vulnerabilities in the structure. 
Since the quantum structure is able to detect Eve’s eavesdropping activity, an 
all-quantum structure is more robust in terms of resisting attacks. So fully 
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eliminating the convention channel and all the classical elements in the structure 
is another important research direction in the future. 
In addition, other quantum key distribution protocols proposed prior to this 
dissertation also experience the low efficiency problem, and they are not able to 
defend against Eve effectively. Future research work should also focus on how 
to improve the efficiency of the key distribution process and the ability to 
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